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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE SALARIES OF TEACHERS IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF DELAWARE
Joseph Edv/ard Johnson, Jr. Ed.D.
University of Massachusetts, 1975
Chairman: Dr. David Flight
The purpose of this study was to determine the effect
that collective negotiations have had on the percentage change
in salaries of public school teachers. Questions which this
study attempted to answer were as follows
:
1 . Do teachers who bargain collectively cause
their salaries to increase by a higher
percentage during the years of bargaining than
during years prior to the bargaining process?
2. Will percentage of salary increases be higher in
a year when teachers conduct a job action than
in years without a job action?
3. Have collective negotiations caused a change in
the form or structure of the salary schedules of
teachers?
The data collected were the scheduled salaries of
teachers in each of Delaware's twenty-six (26) public school
districts for the nine (9) year period beginning with the
school year 1965-1966 and ending with 1974-1975.
The annual percentage gains were computed for each
of the nine years. Comparisons were made to determine the
difference in levels of gain between the negotiating and non-
negotiating years, also job action and non-job action
years. Additional comparisons were made to determine if
tbe negotiating process caused tbe district's overall
level of gain to increase.
The major conclusions of the study are as follows:
1. Collective negotiations have not produced
higher percentage gains in teacher salaries for
most public school districts in Delaware.
2. Collective negotiations did not produce the
highest annual percentage increase in salary
in most public school districts in Delaware.
3. Job actions or strikes do not always produce a
salary increase.
4. Collective negotiations have not altered the
structure of the salary schedules of the teachers
in Delaware.
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CHAPTER I
THE EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SALARIES OF
TEACHERS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF DELAWARE
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Introduction
Teachers, like most members of the American society,
grew up in a tradition which attempted to convey the mes-
sage that the opportunities are equal for all people to par-
ticipate in the decisions which affect their own lives.
The tenets of democracy are taught at every level of the
educational system. Our news media often portray situ-
ations that suggest "democracy" is working. With these
democratic beliefs and the implied "American way" con-
tinuously being reinforced, it should be expe ted that
teachers would demand to be active participants in the
development of their own job environment.
Teachers have gained strength as individuals and
also in their organizations. Through collective negoti-
ations, a process where employees and supervisors engage
in a give and take discussion over working conditions,
salaries and employee rights, teachers have been re-
cognized by employers as equal participants in the dev-
2elopment of many policies which directly affect them as
employees. Using the collective negotiations process,
teachers now can have an opportunity to meet at the bar-
gaining table with representatives of their employer, to
share equally in the establishment of their yearly salaries
and working conditions.
The teacher organizations have identified collect-
ive negotiations as a vehicle available to accomplish
the goal of complete involvement in structuring condit-
ions of work and levels of compensation. At its 1962
convention the American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
passed a resolution encouraging "all locals not now en-
joying the benefits of a bona-fide collective bargaining
(collective negotiations) contract to initiate appro-
priate steps leading toward this goal, as soon as possible."
The largest of the teacher organizations, the National Edu-
cation Association (NEA) had occasionally discussed the
necessity for group action, and at its 1962 convention
"official policy on negotiations was formulated" to serve
2
as a guideline for local organizations.
From this writer's point of view the collective
negotiations process is relatively new in public educa-
tion primarily for two reasons:
^"American Federation of Teachers, The American
Teacher
,
November 12, 1962, p. 8.
^Michael H. Moskow, J. Joseph Loewenberg, Edward
Clifford Koziara, Collective Bargaining in Public Emp-
loyment , (New York: Random House, 1970) p. 141.
1 . 3Firstly, for many years teachers avoided the
process of organizing and negotiating believ-
ing that such a procedure was "unprofessional,"
and belonged only to organized labor.
2. Secondly, the absence of specific laws per-
mitting teachers the right to negotiate led
many to believe that it was illegal to do so.
The alleged illegality was used as a reason to
block teacher participation through collective
negotiations
.
It was not until the ninety-ninth meeting, the
1961 convention, of the National Education Association
that this body publicly accepted the position that the
employee had "the right to participate in the determin-
ation of policies of commoi;. concern including salary and
3
other conditions for professional service."
One of the first pieces of legislation passed by
Congress to encourage unions and collective negotiations
4
was the Wagner Act (1935) . This Act specifically excludes
all public employees' including teachers from sharing in
the right to bargain collectively, which was granted in
the private sector.
The current widespread use of collective negotia-
tions in public education is an apparent indication that
3National Education Association, Addresses and Pro-
cedings o f the Ninety-ninth Meeting , (Atlantic City, N.J.,
June, 1961). p. 217.
4Wagner Act, Statutes at Large , XLIX Sec. 7, (a)
449 U.S
.
Code, Vol. XXIX, Sec. 155 (1935)
.
4problems concerning "professionalism" and "legality" have
been minimized or eliminated. Apparently, collective ne-
gotiations are now widely accepted in the public educat-
ional community.
Collective negotiations have changed the procedure
for setting public school teachors salaries from a unilater-
al administrative decision, to one which includes the in-
volvement of administrators, the recipient employees and
their representatives. This investigation sought to an-
swer the question: Is the percentage of salary change for
teachers higher when established throrgh the collective
negotiations process (recipient involvement) than the per-
centage of change gained when established without benefit
of the collective negotiations?
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to determine the effect
that collective negotiations has had on the percentage
change in salaries of public school teachers. Specifically,
the hypotheses of this study were as follows:
Hypotheses
1. Teachers who bargain collectively cause their
salaries to increase by a higher percentage
during the years of bargaining than during
years prior to the bargaining process.
The percentage of salary increase in a school
district will be higher in a year when the
2 .
5
teachers conduct a job action for salaries,
than in years without a job action by teachers.
3. Collective negotiations have not caused a change
in the form or structure of the salary sche-
dules of teachers.
In addition to the above research problems, this
investigator attempted to answer the following questions:
1. Are there other factors that have had a
greater impact on teachers' salaries than
collective negotiations?
2. Have budget referenda defeats affected the
scheduled salaries of the teachers?
. . . 5Definition of Terms
Collective negotiations: a procedure where two or more
parties engage in meaningful "give-and-take" dis-
cussions to define terms and conditions of employ-
ment, rights of the employee and methods for
settling disputes. The results are usually in-
corporated in a written document agreed upon and
signed by the parties.
Collective bargaining: the term used by the American
Federat ion of Teachers and other organs* zed labor
groups when referring to the process of collect-
^The definitions used in this study represent a
composite of the descriptions resulting from this
writer's experiences and research of the literature.
6
ive negotiations. See collective negotiations.
Credited work experience: each year of teaching ex-
perience and or military experience which the
employee is allowed to count for pay purposes.
Educational level: the position on the salary schedule
determined by the number of educational decrees
or credits toward a degree that the employee has
completed.
Experience level: the position on the salary schedule
determined by the total credited work experience
of the employee.
Job action: a strike; a concerted effort by members of
a teacher organization who withdrew their services
in protest of a situation or condition; examples:
mass sick-outs by employees, work slow downs,
picketing and other such actions.
Meet and confer: the process which allows committees
of employees the right of conference with the
employer to discuss working conditions and other
matters of mutual concern.
Monopsony: exclusive control of all of the job positions
in a specific job area as a result of being the
only agency using that service in that area. Example
large metropolitan school district with no other
districts in the area, or isolated small districts.
7Professional negotiations: the term used by the Nat-
ional Education Association for the process of
collective negotiations. See collective negoti-
ations
.
Salary: the taxable compensation paid to an employee
for services rendered during specified teaching
hours
.
Salary schedule: the guide which is used to determine
the salary paid to a teacher. The guide is two
dimensional using the experience level and edu-
cational level to compute the salary.
School board representative: the individual or group
having authority to present the Board of Educat-
ion's position during the negotiation sessions.
Spillover effect: the benefits gained as a result of
a district choosing to, or feeling forced to
follow, the pattern of surrounding districts.
Significance of the Study
The general objective of this study was to deter-
mine the relationship between collective negotiations
and the relationship between collective negotiations
and the salary structure of teachers. More specifically,
the investigation examined the effects of collective
negotiations on the percentage of increase of teachers'
salaries. This study has significance because it will
8assess whether all of the time and energy expended on the
collective negotiations process in education will produce
the results that people expect. This subject has not
been documented before in this comprehensive way, adding
to its significance.
The investigation is significant because it adds
data to an area lacking in researched information. There
are few studies in the field which describe the effects
of the collective negotiations process on teachers' salaries.
Because of the current drive in Delaware and at the
national level for new legislation to regulate collective
bargaining by teachers, the timeliness of the study gives
it significance. Information on the effects of collective
negotiation activities on salaries plus the review of
practices in other stqtes may be helpful in drafting the
concepts of the new legislation. It is hoped by this
writer that strategies for additional studies will emerge,
adding to the significance of this investigation.
This study differs from other investigations known
to this writer in the following ways
:
1. This study investigates the development of
teacher salary schedule preparation for a
period of nine (9) years, approximately
four (4) years prior to a negotiations law
in Delaware and extending five (5) years
9into the period after the passage of that
lav. This period of time, which is longer
than those of other studies, allowed the
investigator to observe a trend in salary
preparation in the districts. This was
not possible in previously known studies
> which were one and two year studies.
2. Salary data were taken from each pay level
of the salary schedule. (See Strategy for
the Investigation, p. 18) . Included were
the salary samples of beginning teachers,
teachers in the mid-range of the experience
level and teachers at the maximum experience
lev-;l. All levels of educational training
were a part of the total sample. This writer
checked the sampling technique used in the
other studies. The comparison showed that the
larger number of samples with the wider range
as used in this study gave a more accurate
account of the percentage change of salary in
each district.
The salary variable in other known research projects
has been limited to average state salaries, average salaries
in the district, beginning salaries only, maximum salaries
only and salaries from a specific educational level. Be-
ginning salaries only, maximum salaries only and salaries
10from a specific educational level were all rejected as
variables by this writer for the reasons mentioned above.
Average salaries actually paid, which includes average
state salaries and average salaries in a district also were
rejected. Average salaries were rejected because they can
change m any one year by the loss of experienced teachers
or the addition of beginning teachers or any combination
of both.
This investigator used scheduled salaries from all
educational and experience levels. Scheduled salaries are
not affected by the number of employees at any one level.
Previous Research Results
Past research on the effect.1; of teacher negotiations
on salary increases have produced varied conclusions.
Reiter (1974) concludes in his article on "Teacher Compen-
sation and Its Determinants, " "the jury has to remain out
with regard to any conclusions about the impact of col-
lective negotiations and its procedures on the improvement
of the compensations of teachers."^
The study by Lipsky and Drotning (1973) reported
that the inconsistent research results "may be at-
tributed to different research design and methods;
6
Herbert D. Reiter, "Teacher Compensation and Its
Determinants," Know How, (Vol. XXV, No. 7, March,
1974.)
11
but whatever the reasons for the inconsistencies, the
relationship between teacher unionism and salaries is
not yet completely clear.” 7
Findings from research studies by Perry and
Wildman (1970), 8 Hall and Carroll (1973) 9 and Thornton
(1973) support the conclusion that negotiations have
effected the salary increases received by teachers.
Conversely, Kasper (1970) 11 Lindman (1970) 12 and
Smith (1972) ^ deny that the findings prove any signi-
ficant influence of collective bargaining on the sal-
aries of teachers. Investigations by Landon and Baird
7
.Lip sky and Drotning, p. 18.
8
Charles R. Perry and Wesley Wildman, The Impact
of Negotiations in Public Education: The Evidence from
the Schools
, (Worthington, Ohio, Charles A. Jones Pub.
Co., 1970.)
Q
W. Clayton Hall and Forman E. Carroll, "The Effects
of Teachers' Organizations on Salaries and Class Size."
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (26,2 January,
1973), p. 840.
^Robert J. Thornton, "Collective Negotiations
and Teachers' Salaries," Quarterly Review of Economics
and Business
, 11:4, Winter, 1971, p. 37.
^Hirschel Kasper, "The Effects of Collective Bar-
gaining on Public School Teachers' Salaries," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, (24 October, 1970), p. 70.
12Erick L. Lindman, "Are Teachers' Salaries Im-
proving?" Phi Delt <i Kappan , (April, 1970).
13
Allen W. Smith, "Have Collective Negotiations
Increased Teachers' Salaries?" Phi Delta Ka^oan , (10,
June 1973.) p. 682.
12(1972) 14 and Lipsky and Drotning (1973) 15 report mix-
ed findings. Their studies show that collective neg-
otiations proved to be a significant factor in some
school districts and insignificant in other districts.
Smith (1973) in a synopsis of information taken
from several studies was unable to show that collect-
ive negotiations made a difference in terms of in-
creasing salaries. However, he was quick to suggest
since the collective negotiations drive took place
during a period in which the teacher shortage was being
eliminated it (collective negotiations) may have been
responsible for preventing a decline in teachers'
16
salaries." Muir (1970) in a research study in the
Canadian school system concluded, "factors other than
teachers' organizations and negotiations had the great-
,
i 7
est impact on salaries."
Kasper (1970) studied the effect of collective
bargaining and the average state-wide salaries of teach-
14
Robert N. Baird and John H. Landon, "The Effects
of Collective Bargaining on Public School Teachers'
Salaries: A Comment." Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, (25,3, April, 1972) p. 410-417.
15
Lipsky and Drotning, p. 18.
^Smith, p. 682.
17
James D. Muir, "Canadian School Teachers Sal-
aries: Impact of Collective and Other Factors," (un-
published dissertation, Cornell University, New York,
1970) .
13ers for the 1967-1968 school year. it was concluded:
researcn at the school district level is
necessary to improve estimates of the
effect of collective bargaining and re-
presentation on teachers' salaries. ^8
Baird and Landon (1972) indicated that Kapser's
conclusion "was biased by inappropriate specifications
of the principle independent variable and weakened by
other conceptual and statistical flaws. Unionization,
when correctly specified, has a substantial positive
with monopsony power there is no evidence that the pre-
sence of a union organization has raised salaries." 19
Thornton (1971), investigating the effects of
collective negotiations using 83 school districts in
cities with more than 100,000 population in the United
States, released findings indicating that "collective
negotiations do seem to have paid substantial dividends
for teachers in the form of higher scheduled salaries,
20
most notably at the upper end of the salary structure."
Using the average salary in 118 elementary school dist-
influence on teacher salaries. However, in districts
18Kasper, p. 71.
l9Baird and Landon, p. 410.
2°Thornton, p. 37.
14
ricts in Cook County Illinois, Hall and Carroll (1973)
report a strong indication that "teachers' organizat-
ions do indeed increase salaries."
. . . "the magni-
tude of the increase is relatively small." 21 Perry and
Wildman (1970) indicated "that the threatened or actual
exercises of teacher groups have had an impact on both
# 2 ?the level and structure of teacher compensation."
Lipsky and Drotning (1973) analyzing the in-
fluence of collective negotiations on the teacher
salaries in the state of New York used as their sample
all of the districts in the state except New Y' :k City.
The data were taken from the salary schedule at the
bachelor's degree, first step; plus thirty hours, sixth
step; and the degree plus sixty hours of earned credit,
23
eleventh step.
Using the salary schedule data in regression models
with information on size of district, percentage of
teachers with advanced degrees, pupil-teacher ratio and
debt service as variables they concluded the following:
Collective bargaining was found to have had
no effect on teacher salary levels, regard-
less of whether the dependent variable was
a measure of actual earnings (mean salary) or
of scheduled rates.
In an attempt to correct for spillover effects,
the model was tested on certain New York state . .
.
21
Hall and Carroll, p. 840.
2 o
Perry and Wildman, p. 23.
23Lipsky and Drotning, p. 19.
15small town districts
. . . the union effect
was positive and significant for bothtypes of salary measure
. . . these districts
were both relatively isolated from spill-
over and had a certain amount of monopsonypower, so that a position bargaining effectis more likely here than elsewhere.
^
After reporting the mixed results, Lipsky and
Drotning's conclusion ended with: "For the state as a
whole, without any correction for spillover, the
salary effect of teacher unions was not significantly
different from zero. The contrasting views previ-
ously identified in the literature gave this writer
justification for further investigation of the still
unresolved question of the true effects of negotiations
on teachers' salaries.
Data Problems in the Investigation
This study contains the following limitations.
The major limitation was the nature of the phenomenon
being investigated. The concept of collective nego-
tiations varies so widely that procedures being accepted
as collective negotiations in one location may in no way
resemble the actual practice in another location.
In some districts the bargaining concept may
generate a hotly contested, adversary struggle. In other
districts there may be no resistance to the entire nego-
24
Ibid., p. 35.
25 Ibid.
tiations procedure. Therefore, another limitation is
the difficulty in identifying all of the factors that
produce a final resolution in salary negotiating.
A third limitation to this study has been the
accessibility of the records. This invv stigator used
salary schedules in the files of the state teacher
organization and state records. However, the inform-
ation on actual salary schedule construction had to be
obtained from the local districts. In a few instances,
the role of teacher representation in earlier salary
schedule construction had not been recorded and had to
be reconstructed at the time of the study.
A final limitation was the unavailability of data
to measure the "spillover effect" on salary raises. The
board may have been forced or may have chosen to give
pay raises and other bene'. : ts to its teachers because of
the pressure of surrounding districts. Increases of
this type were present prior to collective negotiations.
The conduct of the study has not been altered by
these limitations. This investigator formulated the
conclusion with the limitations understood and acknow-
ledged.
Design of the Study
Describing the design of this study center on the
data sources, the strategy for the investigation, the re-
quired data, and method of collection of the data.
The Data Source 17
The population for this study consisted of a
school administrator in each Delaware public school
district who had knowledge of, or actually developed
the teachers' salary schedule. Each public school
district in the state of Delaware is a part of this one
hundred percent population. Nineteen (19) personnel ad-
ministrators, three (3) assistant superintendents and
three (3) superintendents were the respondents who com-
pleted the questionnaire used to collect the data.
The state of Delaware proved to be a good data
source as a sample for this study for the following
reasons
:
1. Delaware is a small state; 47th in land mass
and 48th in population. Travel to all school
districts was practical and convenient.
2. There are only 26 public school districts in
the state; this resulted in a manageable,
one hundred percent coverage.
3. Delaware has a history of negotiations in
education and a statute supporting the process.
4. During the years identified for the study,
some school districts negotiated with teacher
organizations while other districts did not
negotiate with its teachers.
5 .
10
Salary information for the period of the
study was available.
6. The negotiations process in some districts
has been in progress for approximately five
years. This permitted sufficient time to
observe a trend and detect a pattern in the
development of the salary schedules.
Strategy for the Investigation
The design of this study was to determine the re-
lationship between collective negotiations and teachers'
salaries during the nine (9) year period beginning with
the s hool year 1965-1966 and ending with the school
year 1974-1975. The study specifically was to determine
the effects of the independent variable, collective
negotiations, on the dependent variable, percent of
change of the salaries of teachers in the public schools
of Delaware.
The strategy for the investigation inclused the
following
:
Step I Each of the twenty-six (26) public school
districts in Delaware were classified
according to negotiation status. Negoti-
ating and non-negotiating years were identi-
fied within each district.
Step II Scheduled salaries were collected from
each school district for each of the nine
19
(9) school years, 1965-1966 to 1974-1975.
For the same period, information was col-
lected from the state salary schedule^
to be used as a reference in the analy-
sis process.
Step III Fifteen (15) salary samples were taken
from each of nine (9) annual salary
schedules in each school district.
A. The sample salaries represent one of
the following educational levels:
1. Bachelor's degree (B)
2. Bachelor's degree plus thirty
additional credits (B 30)
3. Master's degree (M)
4. Master's degree plus thirty
additional credits (M 30)
5. Doctorate degree (D)
B. For each of the above educational levels
three experience levels were sampled:
1. Zero years of experience in
teaching (O)
2. Five years of experience in
26
Each year the state of Delaware amends the salary
section of the education statutes (Title 14, Delaware
Code) by mandating new minimum salary levels for all
educational employees in public school districts. This
section of the Code is known as the state salary sche-
dule .
20
teaching (5) 2
7
3. Maximum number of years of credit
given on that educational level (M)
Step IV In each district, the percentage of
salary change was computed for each
year at each educational and experi-
ence level. Using this information,
the district's annual salary percentage
change average for each year was deter-
mined. This percentage for each year
has been used for each of the com-
parisons made in this study.
Step V During the analysis phase of the study
the following procedures were completed.
A. To determine if collective negoti-
ations caused salaries to increase
by a higher percent the following
comparisons were made:
1. In each district, the salary
percentage change during
the negotiating years was com-
pared with the change in the
non-negotiating years.
2. In each district a comparison
27This study required an experience level at a point
between the beginning levels and the maximum level. The
five year level was selected because it was the median
point on more than half of all the salary scales in the
state of Delaware.
21
y>as made to determine the number
of times that the annual per-
centage change for negotiating
years and the annual change in
non-negotiating years were above
or below the district's overall
percentage change.
B. To determine the effects of a job
action on teachers' salaries, the
percentage change of salary in a
year when that district's teachers
conducted a job action was compared
with the distri- c overall percentage
change in salary. There were two
methods of comparison.
1. The position of the change above
or below the district's overall
percentage change.
2. The actual rate of salary change
for the job action year was
compared with the rate of change
in other years to determine the
actual difference.
C. In each district the structure of the
salary schedules in the negotiating
years was compared with the schedules
in non-negotiating years. The areas
of comparison included:
1. Experience levels added or deleted.
2. Education levels added or deleted.
3. Longevity levels added or deleted.
Step VI An analysis was made from additional
information collected (1) to determine
the number of times that budget defeats
prevented salary raises; and (2) to
determine additional factors associated
with the effects of collective negoti-
ations on the salaries of teachers.
This process was accomplished through
survey questions on the questionnaire.
Required Data and Method of Collection
Required Data
A. To determine salary percentage changes the
collected data include;
1. Fifteen salary samples identified earlier,
from each district's annual salary schedule
for each of the nine (9) years of the
study. To get the first percentage change,
it was necessary to record the salaries
from the year immediately prededing the
study.
2. Years and districts in which salary sche-
dules were constructed through collect-
. 23
ive negotiations.
3. Years and districts in which salary
schedules were constructed after a job
action or strike.
B. To determine the effects of collective negoti-
ations on the form and structure of the salary
. schedule the following information was re-
trieved.
1. Years and districts where experience
levels wer<j added to, or removed from
the salary schedule,
2. Years and districts where educational
levels were added to, or removed from
the salary schedule,
3. Years and districts where longevity levels
were added to or removed from the salary
schedule
.
C. Additional information surrounding specific
problems or factors associated with col-
lective negotiations were retrieved from each
district and included in analysis phase of the
study
.
Method of Colle ction
To obtain the necessary salary data for computat-
ions of percentage changes, this writer personally
searched the salary records on file with the Delaware
24State Education Association, Wilmington Federation of
Teachers and the Wilmington Public Schools. it became
necessary to solicit raw data concerning the nature of
I
negotiation activities, job actions in the district
and factors affecting salary changes directly from
knowledgeable individuals in each school district.
A self-administered questionnaire wa-. selected as
the instrument able to retrieve, the needed additional
data. The self-administering questionnaire saved time
for the respondent and this writer. It was economical
to administer because it was mailed to each district
and returned by the same method. Only one additional
letter was required to get an eighty percent response.
Personal telephone calls completed the collection pro-
cess producing a one hundred percent response.
This writer was not able to locate a questionnaire
to meet the specific needs of this study. For that
reason, an instrument was designed to fulfill the re-
quirements previously specified.
Organization of the Investigation
The second chapter of this dissertation presents a
descriptive overview of selected literature related to
this study. Chapter three is a discussion of the method-
ology for gathering the needed information. Included is
the description of the data collection technique, the
questionnaire find a detailed analysis of the problem.
25Chapter four is a presentation of the data with a com-
plete analysis of the same. Finally, chapter five, is
the summary of the investigation with this writer's
conclusion and recommendations.
26
CHAPTER II
A REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Overview
This chapter attempts to summarize much of the
literature that is related to collective negotiations
in education. More specifically, this review has been
designed to illuminate the historical and legal aspects
of the bargaining process in the public schools. Ad-
ditionally, this chapter will describe conditions
associated with the bargaining procedure, and will give
a brief description of the roles taken by the organi-
zations most prominently involved in the negotiation
activity of teachers.
Cited earlier in this study as a primary cause for
teachers having been without collective bargaining rights
was the lack of legislation supporting those rights. This
writer will identify significant legal conditions which
aided in the changed posture of teachers toward collect-
ive negotiations.
A second reason given for the lack of negotiations
activity was the label that educators themselves placed
on the process. Information to be presented will show
that many teachers considered negotiations to be un-
27
sional
,
with a feeling that this activity had
no place in the spectrum of public education. It will
also be shown that the present position taken by the
national organizations has given rise to strong profes-
sional support for collective negotiations by teachers.
Additional supporting information will describe
the process of collective negotiations as they specifi-
cally apply to public education. The concept of a
single salary schedule will be described; included will
be the importance of this schedule in determining
teachers' salaries in the collective negotiation process.
Lastly, before the summary
,
there will be a review of
the conditions that have made this study possible in the
state of Delaware.
The Teacher Organizations
In a recent report, Anderson (1973) describes
the growth of public employee unionism as "one of the
most significant developments in labor management re-
lations over the past decade."
1 This growth is caused
by two factors, "the desire of public employees for
wages and benefits comparable to those in the private
sector and the enactment of collective bargaining laws
as the means through which these desires can be realized.
1Arvid Anderson, The Impact of Public Section
gaining
,
Wisconsin Law Review, Uni. of Wisconsin, Madison
Vol . 1973, Number 4. P. 2
^Ibid.
20
Teachers constitute the largest number of organized
public employees. According to Anderson, if the two
teacher organizations, the National Education Associ-
ation (NEA) and the American Federation of Teachers
(AFT) were to merge they would create an organized
labor group second in size only to the International
3Brot) erhood of Teamsters. The National Education
Association has 1.4 million members
4
and the American
Federation of Teachers has a membership of 425,000
teachers .
^
Both the NEA and the AFT have been significantly
instrumental in producing the increased teacher in-
volvement in collective negotiations. Presently, their
approach and acceptance of the bargaining process are
very similar. These similarities have not always existed.
Doherty and Oberer re, ort:
It is rare that two organizations markedly
dissimilar in origin, structure, and style
should come to, pursue identical objectives
in similar fa-hion. Yet, as one looks at
the recent activities of affiliates of the
National Education Association and the
American Federation of Teachers, organi-
zations which over the years have held
widely differing views on the proper role
of teacher association one is impressed g
more by similarities than by differences.
^Ibid.
4Bernard Bard, "Albert Shanker, A Portrait in
Power," Phi Delta Kappan, March 1975, Vol. LVI, No. 7, p.470.
5 Ibid.
^Robert E. Doherty and Walter Oberer, Teachers ,
School Boards, and Collective Bargaining: A Changing of
the Guard
,
(Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial
and Labor Relations, Cornell University., 1967), P. 22.
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As the two organizations are discussed an attempt
will be made to identify the factors that led to the
present position that each organization takes concerning
collective negotiations.
The National Education Association (NEA )
The NEA generally has been identified as a pro-
fessional teachers' organization which for many years
avoided any affiliation with, or acceptance of, the
union oriented labor mov.mont or its tactics. Accord-
ing to VJesley, the NEA, under the name of the Nation-
al Teachers' Association was formed "to elevate the
charactc and advance the interest of the profession
of teachii
, ,
to promote the cause of popular education
7in the United States." The feeling of dedicL.' ion to
the profession appears to have been tl motivating
force of the founders. "The National Education Associ-
ation during its first half century (1857-1907) was not
greatly concerned with the personal welfare of either
administration or teachers. The lofty impersonal de-
tachment that characterized the leaders was not a pose
or revelation of indifference, but a deliberatately
O
adopted philosophy." The apparent goal was to get the
7
Edgar B. Westley, The NEA; The First Hundred
Years
,
The Building of the Teaching Profession , (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), P. 22-23.
g
Ibid. P. 334
profession of teaching established. Placing attention
30
on such personal goals as salary, tenure and status
was considered "premature" and "secondary" to the
growth of the profession.^
However, as early as 1857, the NEA as a group
focused its attention on professional problems and
also, projected an occasional call for more adequate
salaries. In 1863, the NEA president, John D.
Philbrook insisted, "that the situation of the teacher
mu.-t be made desirable by adequate compensation." It
war at that time that the association first passed a
resolution on salaries. Westley writes, that in
1884, the NEA a£jpointed a committee for the purpo? :
of improving salaries. Since 1907 the NEA has had
the strength, power and machine?''/ to wield enormous
influence for the improvement of teacher welfare
13
since 1920 it has done so.
In the early 1900's the association began to
divert some of its efforts toward the needs of its
members. By 1910 there was some interest in teacher
welfare; in the 1920 's it (NEA) was speaking to higher
salaries and tenure laws; in the 1940's there was the
9
Ibid.
l0
Ibid.
,
P. 24.
1!LIbid.
,
P. 334.
12Ibid.
,
P. 25.
13
Ibid., P. 335.
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militant defense of teachers and their rights. 14
In a 1947 statement issued by the executive
committee of the NEA, teachers were urged to employ
group action to obtain "professional salary scales."
The statement further instructed the members to be
bold and forthright" in their demands. 1 ^ The 1950's
saw the start of the drive for professional standards,
more reasonable work loads, in addition to continued
• lfiimprovement in economic status.
Despite the philosophical changes that were
taking place in the early 1900's, it was not until
the early 1960's that the NEA publicly accepted its
role and advocated joint employee-employer determin-
ation of policies. In 1961 the United Federation of
Teachers (AFT affiliate) won collective bargaining
• 17
rights for the teachers of New York City. Possibly,
as a result of the AFT drive the NEA and its affili-
ates changed their stance and began to seek collect-
ive negotiations for teachers.
During the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting, (1961)
the NEA passed a resolution approving support for
14 Ibid., P. 337.
15
"The Professional Way to Meet the Educational
Crisis," NEA Journal
,
February, 1947), P. 79.
16Westley
,
P. 337.
17Moskow, Loenberg, Koziara, P. 141.
32the "right of professional organizations to parti-
cipate in the determination of policies of common
concern, including salary and other conditions for
professional service." 18 At the NEA annual meeting
in 1962, another resolution was approved adopting
the concept of the term professional negotiations
Singe 1962 the association has been actively en-
19
gaged in efforts to organize, gain exclusive recog
nition and to negotiate collectively.
The NEA was now being classified as a "mili-
tant and determined" organization. 20 Little differ-
ence can be detected between an NEA affiliate or a
union-labor oriented AFT affiliate, when each is bar-
gaining for its membership. 2 ^
The American Federation o f Teachers (AFT )
Organizing the T aching Profession , the history
book of the AFT, identified the Chicago Teachers
Federation (CTF) (the first teachers' union) as an
organization which at its inception in 1897 selected
as its purpose the following goals: bettering teachers'
18
National Education Association, Addresses and
Procedings of the Ninety-Ninth Meeting, (Atlantic City,
N. J. June 1961), P. 217.
^National Education Association, Addresses and
Procedings of the One Hundredth Annual Meeting, (Denver,
Colorado, July, 1962), P. 397.
20Moskow, Lowenberg, Kozian, P. 144.
2
^Ibid., P. 145.
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salaries? gaining teachers rights; plus the estab-
lishment of a pension law. From its initial or-
ganization as a union in 1919, the American Federation
of Teachers, listed as one of its objectives, the
obtaining of all of the rights for which teachers
23are entitled. The AFT, unlike the NEA has always
been considered an "employee organization. 1,24
Moskow (1966) indicates that prior to officially
advocating collective bargaining in 1935, the AFT gave
support to teacher councils and increased teacher parti-
25
cipation in policy making. A document that is con-
sidered to be the first legally negotiated agreement
between a board of education and a teacher organization
goes as far back as 1938. It was the agreement negotiat-
ed by the Proviso Council (one of several sub-chapters)
of the West Suburban teachers Union. ^6
In December, 1961, the United Federation of
Teachers (UFT) an affiliate of the AFT, won the right to
^American Federation of Teachers, Organizing the
Teaching Profession , (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955, P. 21
23 . .
The Constitution of the American Federation of
Teachers, (Washington, D.C.: The Federation, 1964
(Revised), P. 3.
24
Doherty and Oberer, Teachers and School Boards ,
P. 24.
25
Michael H. Moskow, Teachers and Unions, The
Applicability of Collective Bargaining .in Public Educat-
ion, (Philadelphia : Wharton School of Finance and Commerce
1966) , P. 106-107.
34bargain for teachers in New York City. However, the
AFT did not actively encourage the locals to seek
bargaining rights until after the 1961 UFT victory. 27
That victory marked the beginning of the AFT drive to
seek bargaining rights for teachers in many other cities.
By 1969, AFT locals were actively representing
teachers in large cities such as Baltimore, Boston,
Chicago, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and
in the state of Delaware, the largest city, Wilmington.
^
The AFT has always ac; epted the labor approach in
the resolution of problems surrounding working conditions.
According to Doherty and Oberer, "it was the AFT that
forced the NEA to accept an outlook more typical of
trade unions than the approach normally associated with
. 29professional organizat Lons .
"
Professiona l Negotiations vs. Collective Bargaining
The previous discussions indicate that it has
been the success of the AFT in the bargaining arena
which has prompted the NEA to move in the direction of
the AFT. In the opinion of Moskow, collective bargain-
27
Moskow, Teachers and Unions, p. 106-107.
2®Moskow, Lowenberg, Kozian, p. 145.
29
Robert E. Doherty and Walter Oberer, Teachers ,
School Boards, and Collective Bargaining: A Changing of
the Guard , (Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial
and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1967), p. 22.
35ing is the reason why the policies and objectives of
the NEA and AFT are now closer together."*®
Despit-.e the fact that both organizations have
moved toward each other in bargaining methodology, in
the literature there is still a difference in nomen-
clature used by each organization. The AFT has had a
long affiliation with the labor movement and accepts
the "union term, " collective bargaining, as the name
for the process.
There has been a reluctance by the NEA member-
ship to accept the union approach to labor problems.
Collective bargaining as a tactic was difficult for the
professionals to embrace. To avoid the "union label"
the NEA has used many substitute terms for the bargain-
ing procedure. Some of these terms have been cooperat-
ive determination, collective determination, and even
democratic persuasion .
^
As cited earlier, the NEA adopted the term "pro-
. 32fessional negotiations" at its 1962 annual meeting.
This term apparently gained wide acceptance and is
currently used in the publications of the NEA and its
affiliates
.
"^Michael H. Moskow, "The American Federation of
Teachers and the National Education Association, " in
Collective Bargaining in Government , ed. by J. Joseph
Loewenberg and Michael Moskow, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 69.
31
.
Ibid. p. 145.
o o
Addresses and Procedings of the One Hundreth
Annual Meeting, p. 397.
36Collective Negot int ions
For this study, the writer has chosen to follow a
trend of combininoj the bargaining process nomenclature
of the NEA with that of the APT, developing a third
term called collective negotiations. This is not a
new procedure. The fusing of professional negotiations
and collective bargaining into collective negotiations
is well established. 33
The amalgamation of the titles in no way
changes the process or alters the final
results. "Both organizations (AFT) and
(NEA) now have almost identical poli-
cies on collective negotiations for
example, exclusive recognition, scope
of negotiations, and grievance pro-
cedures with arbitration as the termi-
nal point. They both favor inclusion of
the same types of clauses in collective
agreements and they use the same tactics
in negotiations." 3^
Therefore, "collective negotiations" seoms t > be
a perfect description for the collective action process
practiced by both teacher organizations.
33
T. M. Stinnet, Jack H. Kleinman and Martha L.
Ware, Professional Negotiations in Public Education
,
(New York: McMillian Co., 1967), p. 81.
34
Moskow, "The AFT and NE^," p. 72.
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Teachers and Collective Action
For many years the public image created for
teachers has been projected with words such as, "de-
dication" and "professionalism." Teachers did not
join in the union labor organization drive of the late
1930's. This writer was not able to find evidence of
widespread collective militant action by teachers during
the period when the private sector was so involved.
Although low salaries and limited benefits had been
associated with the profession, the literature does not
usually link teachers and their organizations with move-
ments designed for the purpose of putting individuals
'
salaries and working conditions ahead of the goal to
improve the profession.
Drive for Personal Gains
The drive for personal gains and militant col-
lective action by public school teachers is generally
identified as a phenomenon which developed in the early
1960's as a result of the December, 1961, victory of the
35United Federation of Teachers. The victory resulted
in a settlement which included a forty page negotiated,
written agreement. This agreement was not achieved before
the teachers participated in a one day strike in April,
35
Moskow, Lowenberg, Kozian, p. 141.
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1962, when 20,000 teachers refused to work."^ The
event got much press coverage, not only in New York
City, but also at the national level. It was as a
result of this activity in New York that a large segment
of the public became aware of collective action by
teachers, their demands for increased salaries and a de-
sire for better working conditions.
Shortly after the success of the UFT in New York
City, the NEA changed its public position and en-
dorsed professional negotiations for salaries and work-
. . . 37mg conditions. In January, 1962, the nation was
again alerted to the fact that public employees were
active in the field of collective negotiations with
the issuance of President John F. Kenedy's Executive
Order 10988 which sanctioned union organization for
federal employees. This order was designed to permit
collective bargaining for federal employees but accord-
ing to Cohaney and Dewey, it had wide repercussions for
public employees at non-federal levels and was a 'key
38
turning point" in public employee bargaining.
The UFT strike and victory, the position change by
NEA and the Executive Order giving bargaining rights
to federal employees, all served to reinforce the con-
37Moskow, Teachers and Unions, P. 102.
^Harry P. Cohaney and Lucretia M. Dewey, "Union
Membership Among Government Empl oyees,
11 J. Joseph
Locnberg and Michael H. Moskow, ed., P. 10.
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1962, when 20,000 teachers refused to work. 36 The
event got much press coverage, not only in New York
City, hut also at the national level. It was a result
of this activity in New York that a large segment of
the public became aware of collective action by teachers,
their demands for increased salaries and a desire for
better working conditions.
Shortly after the success of the UFT in New York
City, the NEA changed its public position and endorsed
professional negotiations for salaries and workinq con-
37
^-*-^^ons • In January, 1962, the nation was again alert-
ed to the fact that public employees were active in the
field of collective negotiations with the issuance of
President John F. Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 which
sanctioned union organization for federal employees.
This order was designed to permit collective bargaining
for federal employees but according to Cohaney and Dewey,
it had wide repercussions for public employees at the
non-federal level and was a "key turning point" in public
38
employee bargaining.
The UFT strike and victory, the position change by
the NEA and the Executive Order giving bargaining rights
to federal employees, all served to reinforce the con-
36
.
Ibid.
37Moskow, Teachers and Unions, P. 102.
•50
Harry P. Cohaney and Lucretia M. Dewey, "Union
Membership Among Government Employees ," J. Joseph
Loewenberg and Michael H. Moskow, ed. , P. 10.
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working conditions. Also now is the apparent accept-
ance of the "labor-union" tactics by the teaching
profession as a whole.
The success of the UFT, the NEA policy change
and the President's executive order only serve as a
signal to the public that the teacher organizations have
accepted and are fully involved in the use of concerted
actions for personal gains. These events also reinforce
the understanding that organized labor in the private
sector has no monopoly on the bargaining process.
Teacher bargaining has spread to many states. A
41
recent government report cites forty-two states which
give ; ?me form of authority for teachers to negotiate
with the board of education.
Teacher Militancy
From this writer's experience it is safe to say
that the process of collective action by public school
teachers is now widely used and in a "bold and forthright
manner." Teachers are insisting that their organizations
fight for personal gains for the individual. A close
look at the teachers 1 demands will indicate that local
affiliates are attempting to negotiate agreements that
would give teachers control of decisions normally con-
sidered to be the responsibility of the school principal.
41
Summary of State Policy Regulations for Public
Sector Labor Relations,; U.S. Department of Labor, Labor-
Management Services Administration, V7ashington, D.C., 1975.
41
The question to be answered is, "why has this
group of traditionally peaceful public employees re-
cently displayed such militancy and moved so rapidly
42to collective bargaining?" Quoting from the same
source the question was answered by listing the follow-
ing causal factors
:
a. Changes in the labor force ; the changing
composition of the total labor force has
caused union leaders to look toward
white collar and professional workers.
Public school teachers if successfully
organized could improve the image of
unions in the eyes of other white collar
workers
.
b . Organizational rivalry; the competition
between the N2A and AFT has spurred local
and state affiliates to push for increased
benefits for teachers and raises expectat-
ions and demands
.
c. Larger school districts ; separates the
classroom teacher from the decision makers,
enhancing the need and desire for protect-
ion of the teacher by an organization speci-
cally devoted to his interest.
d. Changes in teacher attitudes ; the "new breed
of teachers" may be a major cause of the
rapid development of collective bargaining
in education. The percentage of male teachers
has increased and the turnover rates for all
teachers have decreased in recent years . The
changes indicate the development of a greater
commitment to a teaching career. As a result
more teachers desir'. a voice in the determin-
ation of their working conditions and of
certain policy questions in education.
e. Executive Order 109R8 ; granting negotiations
Fights to federal employees, which probably
had a spillover effect among public school
teachers. If federal employees could have
the right to negotiate on working conditions,
why not other public employees?43
43Moskow, Loewenberg, Koziara, p. 133.
43 Ibid., pp. 133-135.
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Other factors listed as possible causes for in-
creased militancy on the part of teachers have been the
working conditions in the large cities and the increas-
ed male population in the profession. 44
Miller and Spaulding speaking in favor of the
teachers’ right to militancy state that public educ-
ation has been "unduly tardy" in admitting that the
teachers should be able to bargain collectively the
45
same as any other employees. In explaining the
reason for the development of militant organizations
by teachers Shils and Wh: tier have this to say:
"the teachers' position is reminiscent of labor
in the days before passage of the Wagner Act.
In private industry before 1935, workers had
to strike for recognition, but after 1935 the
National Labor Relations Board developed machin-
ery in which petitions, elections, determination
of the appropriate bargaining unit, and finally
recognition became a substitute for the strike . .
.
.... In the public schools, machinery has not yet
been created to accommodate mature collective
negotiations to the needs of employees .... The
teacher, in concert with his colleague s, is now
mobilizing collective strength .... Tne voices
of teachers are growing more articulate .46
Albert Shanker, National President of the AFT,
answering a request to give the major purpose of the
44Moskow, Teachers and Unions, p. 4.
45Van Miller and Willard B. Spalding, The Public
Administrat ion of American Schools , 2nd ed. (Yonkers on
the Hudson; World books, 1953), p. 534.
4
^Edward B. Shils and C. Taylor Whitter, Teacher s
Administrators and Collective Bargaining , (Newark: Thomas
Y. Cromwell Company, 1969), p. 1.
43
teacher union movement replied, "To see to it that
teachers in America have economic advantages (like
other citizens)
, that they have an organization which
47fights for them." It has been said that the mili-
tancy will be with us and teachers will join organi-
zations as long as "community issues create uniest
and fear in the schools and threaten their security
, ^ 48and tenure as career employees." Teachers are ex-
pected to seek greater control of their jobs and de-
mand a share in making decisions that affect them
because as professionals they are confronted with a
wide variety of problems that must be solved by the
use of a high degree of intelligence and specialized
49
training.
Collective Negotiation^ Pressure
Collective negotiations are bringing more
pressure to bear on the educational system. In many
cities, school authorities have failed to properly
evaluate mounting anxiety and hostility. As a result,
teachers have resorted to strikes, sanctions, boycotts,
.
.
50
walkouts and other means of withdrawing services.
Teachers are reported to be in a state of ferment, at
47Bernard Bard, "Albert Shanker, A Portrait in Power,
Phi Delta Kappan, March, 1975, Vol. LVI, No. 7, p. 466.
48
.
Shils and Whittier, p. 3.
49 . _
Moskow, Teachers and Unions, p. 3.
"^Ibid., p. 20.
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times bordering on rebellion, resulting from a lack of
teaching materials, large classes and low salaries.
In summary, writers in the field contend that
the collective negotiations process is not expected to
solve the problems facing public education today. What
it is doing is helping the teachers to attack perceived
problems of salaries and working conditions in a uni-
fied and collective manner. It has helped the teachers
win the right to be active participants in shaping the
work environment.
Movements of collective action have gained
strength in education. Educational employees are en-
couraged by their successes in gaining recognition and
the right to bargain. Both the NEA and AFT have gen-
erally adopted private sector bargaining procedures as
a wor3cable system for resolving labor problems in the
profession; thus, the process will be arov.nd for the
forseeable future.
Despite all of the bargaining activity in many
states of the union, the general acceptance of the neg-
otiations process by local school districts and the
feeling that it has a place in the educational community,
there is still an unanswered legal question, can school
boards legally bargain and agree to terms surrounding
51
Ibid., p. 20.
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working conditions and salaries? The next section
will investigate the legal aspects of collective
negotiations
.
The Legal Aspects of Teacher Negotiations
One of the obstacles to full implementation of
collective negotiations in public education has been
the uncertainty of the legality of the process. One
a ^- ea that creates this doubt is the specific exclus-
ion of all public employees, including teachers, from
the federal act which gives employees in the private
sector the right to bargain collectively.
In 1935, the Congress of the United States passed
a collective bargaining law known as the National Labor
Relations Act (NJRA) which specifically excluded public
employees using this language to identify employer:
.... any pe v son acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the
United States or any wholly owned Government corp-
oration, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any state
or political subdivision. 5
2
In 1975, this exclusion still prevents many public
employees from sharing in the bargaining process.
A second reason for doubt about the legality of
collective negotiation rights for teachers is the lack
of supporting statutes in many of the states. Teacher
bargaining legislation had not been in evidence pri-
marily because educational organizations were not
52The National Labor Relations Act, (Wagner Act) ,
Statutes at Large, Vol. XLIX (1935), U.S. Code , Vol.
XXIX.
46
sponsoring or encouraging such legislation. Before
1965, only two teacher organizations had given their
c o
endorsement or sponsored bargaining legislation. In
the state of North Carolina the existing statute act-
ually prohibits collective negotiations, adding to the
legal question concerning the right of public school
teachers to bargain collectively.
Opposition to Bargaining
Possibly the one reason that has been most in-
strumental in delaying public school teachers from
gaining bargaining rights is the public's open opposition
to such a process in education. This opposition is found
at the federal, state, and local levels. Opposition
comes from individuals as well as groups
.
One such nationwide opposition group, the "Ameri-
cans Against Union Control (AAUC) is leading a current
drive against coolective bargaining legislation. AAUC
has selected the state of Virginia as a testing ground
for a national effort to halt a trend of collective
55
bargaining for public employees.
At the local level the same type of opposition is
found. School boards tend to resist negotiations by
33Moskow, Teachers and Unions, p. 45.
^Americans Against Union Control of Government is
the new organized political arm of the Public Services
Research Council, a nationwide organization with its
headquarters in the state of Virginia.
5
^Educators ' Negotiation Service, "Anti-Union
Movement Grows in Virginia," ENS Newsletter, January
15,
1975, p. 94.
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loose interpretations of the law to prevent bar-
gaining from taking place. In the early days, the con-
cern by boards was that agreements with employee organi-
zations could be a direct violation of a state law
since there were no statutes or permissive legislation
56
requiring negotiations.
Others who questioned the right of public school
teachers to negotiate or bargain, expressed their basic
objections by holding to the contention that the process
constitutes a serious invasion of school board authori-
57ty. The argument for denial of bargaining rights is
centered on the statement that "delegated powers m; y
CO
not be delegated."
There are boards who have refused to bargain or
negotiate with teachers because of the belief that a
signed contract would astrict the board's freedom to
59
act. Expanding on that same argument, it is implied
that a board binds itself on future employment conditions
when it has a signed contract with an employee organi-
56Shils and Whittier, p. 93.
^Reynolds C. Seitz, "Public Employee Negotiating
and School Board Authority," Legal Problems of School
Boards
,
(Cincinnati, W. H. Anderson Co., 1966) p. 114.
^Moskow, Teachers and Unions , p. 41.
59
Charles Cogen, "The American Federation of
Teachers and Collective Negotiations," Readings on Col -
lective Ncgot iat jjgns_JLn. jh^joc^ducation , Ed. Stanley,
M. Elam, Myron Lieberman, Michael H. Moskow, (Chicago:
Rand McNally and Company, 1967), p. 169.
zation. In so doing, the board
"transgresses" the
authority granted by the state, delegates its own
power illegally, and is considered to be in violation
of the principal of sovereignty. 60
Despite the lack of federal legislation support-
ing bargaining rights for teachers and in some states
the lack of any legislation, teachers are in fact bar-
gaining collectively in many school districts. Several
routes have been used to obtain negotiating rights not
granted through statutes
.
Obtaining Negotiating Rights
Efforts are still being made to. get federal
legislation for public employees, similar to the
private sector statute. However, as late as March,
1975, a report discussing such a bill introduced in
the 94th Congress noted that the drive (in support of
61
the bill) had slowed down, but is remains on the horizon.
If passage should be gained, it may be the first federal
law that would extend to all public employees the pro-
62
tection of the National Labor Relations Act.
Lacking the legal support at the federal level,
teachers have attempted to get legislation at the state
fin
Doherty and Oberer, p. 53.
fi 1
"Bargaining Bill Drive On; NEA Accepts Union
Concept, " The School Administrator-AASA , March, 1975
Vol . 32, 3, V7ashington, D.C.
62
"Compromise Public Employee Bargaining Bill
Due Soon," Education Daily , January 22, 1975, p. 5.
Vol. 8, No. 19.
"
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level to provide the legal framework for collective
negotiations. Although before 1965, teacher organi-
zations had not given their endorsement or sponsored
bargaining legislation, in that year, at least 15
states had received proposed legislation from teacher
groups, gaining successful passage in California,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon and
Washington.^ The 1975 edition of the Summary of State
Policy Regulations for Public Sector Labor Relations
shows that some form of teacher bargaining activity is
64permitted m at least 42 states. Most of this acti-
vity is not covered by any Act or statute.
State Statutes and Bargain ing
However, many of the states presently have bar-
gaining statutes for teachers. The first state statute
which granted teachers the right to negotiate was the
1959 law1 in Alaska. It gave all state and political
subdivisions the right to bargain collectively with
65
employee organizations. Also in 1959, the Industrial
Labor Relations Act in Wisconsin included teachers with
66
other public employees. New Hampshire has had a
statute on its books since 1955, which if tested in the
6 ^
Moskow, Teachers and Unions, p. 45.
64Summary,. Public Sector Labor Regulations
^Shils and Whittier, p. 102.
^ 6Ibid.
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67
courts probably would apply to teachers. The first
legislation giving the right to negotiate directly to
a board of education was the 1962 amended Wisconsin
Court Decisions and Bargaining
In some states where the necessary legislative
support for collective negotiations is not present,
the legal basis for establishing the process in a
school district has been favorable court judgements.
According to Petro, endorsement by court decision ,
rather than by legislation is complicated b ca* e of
. .
69
the inherent limitations of the decisions. Ho-.’ev<. r,
the decisions seem to serve the purpose and collective
negotiations have been implemented.
Illinois is an example of a state where negotiations
take place as a result of a court decision. The question
decided by the Court was whether the Chicago Board of
Education had the right to bargain collectively with
an exclusive agent of its employees without legislation
conferring such a right. The Court held that the Board
of Education of Chicago could bargain with a representa-
tive selected by its teachers and that legislative
Labor Relations Act.^9
67 Ibid. p. 49.
^®Ibid. p. 102.
69Sy]vester Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public
Bargaining , (Wake Forest, N. C. Wake Forest Law
g Wake Forest University, March, 19/4)
Vol. 10,
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authority was not required. it further stated that
the Board could enter into an agreement because it was
70
not against public policy.
The case often cited in the literature regrxrding
collective bargaining rights of teachers is that of
Norwalk Teachers* Association v. Board of Education of
City of Norwalk
. 83 A. 2d 482 (1951)
.
71
In this case
the highest court in Connecticut also ruled in favor of
collective bargaining for teachers without legislation.
Quoting from Legal Aspects of School Board Operat-
ion
, we can see how the Norwalk case supports negoti-
ations with the following paragraph:
The statutes and private acts give broad
powers to the .... (board) with reference
to educe ional matters and school manage-
ment .... If it chooses to negotiate with
the .... (association) with regard to em-
ployment, salaries, grievances procedure
and working conditions of its members,
there is no statute public or private
which forbids such negotiations .72
Findings from the Norwalk case and the state of
Illinois give evidence that the courts will support and
are permitting negotiations to continue in the absence
of legislation.
Chicago Division of the Illinois Education
Assoc iat ion , et. al. v. Board of Education or the City o_f
Chicago
,
222 N.E. 2nd 243 (1966 Appelate Ct. of Illinois,
1st Dist . 1st Div. )
.
7lNorwalk Teachers' Association v. Board of Edu-
cation of City of Norwalk, 138 Conn 269, 83A (2nd) 482
(Connecticut , 1951) . As reported in Legal Aspects^ o_f
School Boards' Operation , Robert R. Hamilton, E. Edmund
Reutter, Jr. (NeV York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers
College, Columbia University, J5Q)
,
p. 63.
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Bargaining and Board Authority
When all other levels of government fail to enact
legislation or statutes for teacher bargaining rights
and no favorable court decision is present, determination
of the legality of teacher bargaining rests with the
local school board. Many school board members would not
wish to negotiate with its teachers until the legal
question is resolved. However, because of the new mili-
tancy, teachers are actively bargaining in many school
districts. To quote Doherty and Oberer:
There is (likewise) a brittleness which the
current militance among public s.hool teachers
has tested to the point of cracking. The
teachers, to the extent they have become
organized for something other than "more of the
same, " have in effect said "to hell with all of
these legalistic arguments; we now have the
muscle through organization to get something
better than the shabby deal we have been getting
for years past, and we hereby demand something
better. "73
Boards of education are not without authority and can
determine the degree of involvement in matters which
it is empowered to control . The board has the author-
ity to set those policies and procedures necessary to
carry out its duties. As a result of this power, the
board should be able to participate in negotiation
74
procedures, even in the absence of a statute.
Theoretically, the board can only use powers
73Doherty and Oberer, p. 53.
74
Stinnett, Kleinmann, Ware, p. 40.
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actually granted to it as a board. However, there are
also implied powers which boards usually tend to inter-
75pret on a broad basis. Board of education power is
classified in the following forms: expressed power;
*7 /
fairly implied power? and necessarily incidental power.
A legal definition of the authority of the school
board is considered to be narrow;
but great freedom is granted courts
in determining whether a particular power
can be classified as "fairly implied" or
"necessarily incidental." In concrete situ-
ations courts .... have gone exceedingly
far in finding legal justifications for
holding that a contested power .... was in
fact implied when the aim .... was deemed
clearly worth while educationally. 77
The following statement very adequately summarizes the
above quote. "There seems to be nothing illegal in a
board's voluntary participation in negotiation proced-
Statutory Language in Bargaining
Even in situations where legislative bodies have
established bargaining rights, the contents of the law
75Willard S. Elsbree, E. Edmund Routter, Jr., Staff
Personnel in the Public School s, (New York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc. , 1954) , p. 409.
^Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Cloudman,
185 Okl . 400, 92 p. 2d 837 (1939). As reported in Lega l
Aspects of School Board Operation , Hamilton and Reutter, p . 4.
7
7
Robert R. Hamilton, E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., Legal
Aspect s of School Board Operation , (New York: Bureau of
Publication, Teachers College, Columbia University, 195 ) ,
p. 4.
78Stinnett, Kleinman, Ware, p. 41.
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and the negotiating limits vary from state to state.
Statutory coverage and substance run the gamut from
bare minimum to near duplication of the private
sector model. The variety of approaches to essentially
similar problems seems infinite." 79 The labels are
frequently confusing because of the attempts to describe
the difference between collective bargaining, and nego-
tiations. Standardization does not exist.
Although there seems to be no standardization of
O 1
the language in the statutes, previous citations
give support to the conclusion that the process known as
professional negotiations by the NEA is quite similar to
the process of collective bargaining executed by the AFT.
This writer discovered that the definitions of collective
bargaining and professional negotiations are often inter-
changed or used to define each other.
This lack of standardization and interchanging of
the definitions tends to lead one to the belief that no-
menclature is not an important factor when referring to
collective negotiations; however, this could not be further
from the truth.
It may be impossible to find a distinction between
79U. S . Department f Labor, State Profiles: Current
Status of Public Sector Labor Relations , (Washington, D.C.
U.S. Government Printing Office, November, 1971), p. III.
80 Ibid.
,
p. IV.
O 1
Supra, footnotes 6, 30, 34.
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the negotiations procedure as actually practiced by
the AFT and the NEA
. For this reason their bargaining
terms may be exchangeable. However, when moving into
the legal sphere, an examination of the statutes and
legal opinions in each state will show that nomen-
clature becomes significant and important.
In a recent opinion, the attorney general of West
Virginia, stressed that nomenclature can be the dif-
ference between a legal and an illegal act. He states
that it is permis sable for a board to negotiate but
82
collective bargaining is not acceptable.
....the two parties may negotiate, incorporate
the results of negotiations into written agree-
ments and appoint a third party to resolve dis-
putes arising from negotiations.
But they may not, under the laws, bargain
collectively. That term .... by implication,
definition, custom or right, includes, in some
instances at least, the right to strike, com-
pulsory or binding arbitration, compulsory or
binding factfinding by a third party, etc....
It is a perfectly legitimate method by which
such county school boards may, and should
attempt to communicate with and resolve dif- gg
ference between themselves and their employees.
The tone of the language in a statute granting
negotiating rights or denying the same usually denotes
the political climate and labor-management attitude
within the state. Statutes also reflect the philosophy
and nomenclature of the dominant educational organi-
82Educato.rs ' Negotiating Service, "West Virginia
Employees Can Negotiate, Not 'Bargain'," ENS NewsleLter ,
October 1, 1974.
83 Ibid.
zation influencing the legislative body which enacted
the legislation. Those (statutes) which might be
termed 'professional' were passed through the legis-
lative influence of state NEA affiliates, the 'collect-
ive bargaining' laws are generally sponsored by the AFT
organization or state affiliates of AFL-CIO." 84
The NE^i attempts to ket i the negotiations process
within the structure of the educational system. In
contrast, the AFT prefers that the authority for admin-
istration be given to the state labor relations council
Hie involvement of the state board of education makes
it professional negotiations. The ordinance becomes a
collective bargaining type when the powers are given to
85
the state labor relations commission.
Proposed Federal Bargaining Legislation
Although each jurisdiction appears to manage its
own labor problems using the statutes which do or do
not exist, there is a movement to get un form legal
procedures for all public sector bargaining. Investi-
gations of the literature and a review of the state
statutes corroborate the fact that the legal framework
of public sector negotiations is very diverse. The
authority for granting negotiating rights to teachers
84
Shils ctnd Whittier, p. 49.
85 Ibid
.
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appears in many forms from the weak "meet and confer"
to the very strong compulsory bargaining as modeled
after the private sector labor statutes.
Each state has developed its own labor environment
for teachers, in response to the relative strength of
the organization pushing for the law. However, the
current drive by the employee organizations is away from
the concept of individual state design, toward federal
legislation giving uniform bargaining rights to all
public employees.
86The present proposals before Congress support
public sector bargaining for both state and local
governments. "With hearings completed in the House
and under way in the Senate, it appears more likely
that Congress will enact public- • ervice employee col-
87
lective bargaining legislation this session." It is
obvious that Congress is increasingly interested in ex-
tending federal employment standards to the public
88
sector.
The newly proposed legislation seeks to place
public employees at the state and local level under the
86
94th Congress, 2nd Session (1975) .
87
Joseph C. Giles, Editor "From the Bargaining
Front, " News Notes , Association of Governing Boards of
Universities and Colleges, February 1975, 6:2, 2.
88
"Public Sector Collective Bargaining," Education
Daily
,
January 29, 1975, 8:20, 4.
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provisions? of the National Labor Relations Act (N .L .R.A
. ).
89
When this Act became law these same public employees were
excluded from the regulation because, "to include emp-
loyees of the state and local governments was considered
an invasion of states' rights." 9 ®
The drive to extend federal legislation on com-
pulsory negotiations to the public sector is encouraged
by the teacher organizations. The AFT is pushing a pro-
posal which would amend the Taft Hartley Act and put
edu< ators under the jurisdiction of the National Labor
91
Relations Board (N.L.R.B.) . Although the NEA would
prefer the final authority of any regulation to be with
public employees rather than the labor oriented private
sector, the NEA is now giving support to the AFT pro-
92
posal
.
The NEA had presented a proposal which would keep
teachers away from the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B.
Apparently, the NEA moved away from supporting its
original proposal toward the AFT position when the AFL-
93
CIO gave support to the AFT proposed legislation.
89Myron Lieberman, "Confusion and Controversy:
Brace Yourself for a Lot of Both, If Congress Passes
This Collective Bargaining Law for Teachers
,
" The
American School Board Journal , April, 1975, p. 41.
90 Ibid.
91Giles, "From Bargaining Front," p. 2.
93Lieberman, Confusion and Controversy, p. 41
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Speaking strongly in favor of full collective
bargaining rights for teachers and public employees,
William Usery, Director of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS) states, "We cannot go on
as a nation denying any group of employees the rights
94that other employees have."
Although there is strong support for federal
legislation from the employee organizations, the opposi-
tion strength has surfaced and appears to be working just
as hard for the defeat of the federal bargaining legis-
lation. At the 1975 convention of the American Associ-
ation of School Administrators the delegate assembly
established a strong position against federal collective
bargaining legislation for public employees. "The
position was expressed in the following resolution:
. . .
.AASA believes state collective negoti-
ation statutes that provide for appropriate
local discretion are and can be more respon-
sive to the needs of educational institutions
than a federal statute 95
The public sector bargaining legislation was
"blasted" by Philip B. Swain, National School Boards
94
"Federal Mediator Speaks for Public Employee
Bargaining," Newsletter: Educators Negotiating Service,
March 15, 1975, 137.
^American Association of School Administrators,
Resolution adopted by AASA Delegate Assembly, Feb. 24,
1975, Dallas, Texas, as reported in The Schoo l Admin^
istrator
,
April, 1975, 32:4, 11.
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Association, president. He is quoted in a news
article as saying :
.... that the proposed federal collective
bargaining legislation was a catastrophe
for America's public schools would
take school policy making out of local
hands, rob parents of the opportunity to
influence their children ' s education and
centralize more authority over local public
schools in the hands of federal agencies. 96
A resolution passed at the National Governors'
Conference in February, 1975, indicated that any
federal legislation mandating collective bargaining
for the public sec Lor "would substantially replace
individual state laws and procedures which now regu-
late these matters . The resolution further states
that "matters relating to the employees of state and
local governments are within the sole jurisdiction of
these units and are not properly the subject of federal
98legislation.
At the same time that legislation is being pre-
sented in Congre- s, the Supreme Court of the United
99
States agreed to hear a case that could take public
sector bargaining away from the federal government and
^"Teacher-backed Bargaining Bills are Blasted by
Swain," The Conventio Daily , NSBA, April 21, 1975,
1:3, 1.
97
"PSRC (Public Service Research Council) lands
Governors Stand on Collective Bargaining," Forewarned ,
May, 1975, II: 2, 2.
98
.
Ibid.
99
National League of Cities V. Brennan.
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give it to the states. 1"00 The Court could rule that
education is still a function of the state and Congress
would have no right to "meddle" in local and state gov-
ernment employee relations. 1-^ 1”
The picture for national legislation for public
sector bargaining remains unclear. The pending de-
cisions from the Supreme Court could prohibit federal
regulation of state and local governmental authorities.
Passage of any bill also remains in doubt. However,
it does appear certain, that failure at the federal
level will undoubtedly renew the drive to strengthen
bargaining lavs at the state level.
Determination of Compensation
Individual BargreIni ng
Through the nineteenth century and into the
present, teache. s and school boards arrived at com-
pensation levels for teachers through individual bar-
. . 102gaming. Each employee was required to speak for
himself. It has been reported that these negotiations
between teacher and school board, although on an in-
1AO
dividual basis, were simple and direct. J-UJ
100
"Higb Court Case May Affect Teacher Bargaining,"
Education Daily, January 29, 1975, p. 4, Vol. 8., No. 20.
101Ibid.
102
Doherty and Oberer, Teachers, School Boards,
p . 9
.
103
Guidlines, No. 11, Negotiations Pointers, NEA-
ACT, Washington, D.C. 1965, p. 3.
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The teacher received what the hoard wa3 willing
to give. The results when compared to the salaries
of other teachers depended on the relative strength
of the teacher doing the bargaining. 104 In thi.’
type of process the opportunities for favoritism
were abundant; the sense of unfairness was very wide-
105
spread. The low salaries that teachers received
during that period can be attributed at least in part
106to the lack of bargaining strength.
As can be expected, a process of paying an em-
ployee based on what that employee' is strong enough
to pressure from the members of the Board or super-
intendent, tied in with chances of permitting favor-
itism and other such arbitrary conditions of assign-
ing a salary level, soon produced many uneven and un-
fair rates of compensation. By the second decade of
the twentieth century a general dissatisfaction pro-
duced a move toward establishing a system that would
make it possible for teachers to receive a uniform
rate of pay. This early system was known as the
107
"position schedule,
"
104
Kershaw and McKean, p. 23.
105
Ibid.
106
p. 9.
Doherty and Oberer, Teachers and School Boards,
107
Ibid., p. 10.
Position Schedule
Tho position schedule established a different
level of salary for each position in the school
system. It established a specific salary or range
of salaries for each grade level. All of the teachers
at that grade level (position) received that amount
of compensation
. Under certain conditions
,
grade
levels were clustered at the same level of compensat-
ion. As an example, grades one, two, and three, may
be considered as the same position and receive the
same level of compensation. Still another sched-
ule was set for high school teachers which generally
gave the high school teacher a rate of pay higher than
the rate received by an elementary school teacher. 109
In the 1920's, the position schedule gave way to
the single salary schedule. 110
Single Salary S chedule
The single salary schedule is described as that
schedule where the level of compensation for the
teacher is determined solely upon professional prep-
aration and years of teacher experience.
111
The degree
of difficulty or amount of talent does not have an
10J
I<ershaw and McKean, p. 22.
inq
"Doherty and Oberer, p. 10.
^°Moskow, Teachers and Unions, p. 72.
111
Doherty and Oberer, Teachers, School Boards,
p . 10
.
affect on the level of the salary.
Xf the experience level and professional prep-
aration are equal, the kindergarten teacher, the
high school physics teacher and the driver education
instructor would all be compensated at the same
112level. ' The schedule itself does not offer the
same amount of compensation in every school district.
That is, the beginning teacher in district "A" will
not necessarily earn the same as the beginning teach-
er in district "B." The number of steps and the dif-
ferent experience levels will vary from district to
district. Some districts spread the same air unt of
money over a longer period of years while other dis-
tricts make it possible for the teachers to get to
the top level of the schedule in a very few years.
The single salary schedule has contii "'.ed with
much strength since the 1920 's. By 1951, as many as
ninety-seven percent of the school districts were
using this system and now the single salary schedule
113
is used almost universally. This system of salary
determination gains strength from its appearance as
a fair process for determining compensation levels
for all teachers. Teachers also have a degree of
112
Ibid.
1 T 3
Moskow, Teachers and Unions, p. 72.
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control of compensation levels because of their
ability to return to school and gain the necessary
credits to move upward on the schedule.
Establishment of the teachers' salary through
collective negotiations has been made easier because
of the general acceptance of the uniform single
salary schedule approach. The exceptions to the use
of the single salary schedule approach are fow des-
pite the fact that the teaching profession is a com-
posite of many individuals working in a variety of
subject areas. The single salary schedule works in
the teaching profession even though sonv-- of the dis-
ciplines such as physics and calculus require a high
degree of skill development with a broad comprehensive
knowledge of the subject area, while, a subject such
as ele ientary arithmetic requires a degree of skill
awareness at a more basic level.
In other words, the varying degrees of relative
difficulty and length of preparation time in a speci-
fic subject area have not moved teachers away from
the acceptance and use of the single salary schedule.
The instruction levels requiring basic skills
only, such as, elementary education subjects have
large numbers of trained and qualified teachers, so
much so that many are not able to find employment in
their field. Areas requiring extensive training such
as physics have only a small number of qualified appli-
114 66cants.-"— It is difficult to find qualified physics
instructors for high school positions. In many profes-
sions scarcity of trained personnel, the degree of
training difficulty, and the conditions of supply and
demand would have produced a widely dispersed salary
pattern. in public education this has not happened.
This writer believes that the evidence shows the uni-
formity of the compensation rates for teachers is the
result of the single salary schedule and its general
acceptance by the teaching profession.
Merit Pay Schedule
Some districts have attempted to move away from
the single salary schedule. Generally, such districts
were looking for ways to reward teachers for merit-
orius service. As a result, a system developed that
became known as the merit system or a schedule called
the merit pay schedule. The principle of the system
or schedules was the assurance of a supplemental in-
crement or bonus over and above the amount received
from the regular schedule. It has been said, that
merit pay schedules pay a higher salary to the teacher
who the "administrator feels has given superior service.
^•l^Taken from a report made on the status of re-
cruitment and qualified applicants for the Wilmington
(Delaware) Public Schools, 1973-1975, (unpublished)
February, 1975, p. 2.
115
Doherty and Obercr, p. 11.
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This system moved back to the arbitrary con-
ditions and possible favoritism found in individual
bargaining. For the most part merit pay schedules
have not been very popular, have been identified as
difficult to administer and have little support for
continued use. It is for these reasons that the
merit system does not appear in many school systems.
The system is definitely not compatible with collect-
ive negotiations.
From this writer's point of view, the single
salary schedule with its uniform method of admin-
istration has proven to be an acceptable salary
system for collective negotiations. Each member of
the! bargaining unit receives a level of compensation
based on experience and education 1 level without any
arbitrary decision by his superior. Favoritism is
removed
.
This particular study has been designed to deter-
mine the effects of collective negotiations on the
salary schedules in Delaware. All twenty-six (26)
school districts in Delaware use a single salary
schedule for teachers
.
The single salary schedule has made it possible
to find common points for comparison of salaries among
each district creating desirable conditions in which
116
Ibid.
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to conduct this study, in addition to a favorable
salary schedule, there are other factors to be con-
sidered. For this reason, a chronology will be given
highlighting the events of the negotiations process
by teachers in Delaware.
Collective Negotiations and Delaware Teachers
Delaware has a state statute granting teachers
the right to negotiate collectively. 117 The Act has
been in effect since October, 1969. However, the
earliest formal activity to gain passage of bargaining
legislation for teachers, known by this writer, was a
bill that was introduced in the Delaware legislature
118in 1957. This bill was designed to give bargaining
rights to all of Delaware's public employees. It in-
cluded items to be negotiated, a provision for medi-
ation and the grievance procedure was to end with
binding arbitration. The legislation did not gain
public support and fai'ed.
In 1965, the state legislature passed a provision
which reads as follows
:
The right of public employees freely to
organize and designate representatives of
ll7This statute is known as Chapter 40, Title 14,
Delaware Code, 1969, (14 Del. C., Ch 40)
.
118Senate Bill 28, January, 1957.
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their own choosing for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining with public employers
shall not be denied. 119
However, when the term "public employee" was defined,
teachers were specifically excluded. Public employee,
according to the act shall be:
....any employee of a public employer except:
(1) (2) any certified professional
employee of the public school system of the
State. 120
It was not until October, 1969, that the teachers
in Delaware were given the right to bargain collect-
ively through a state statute.
In the absence of supportinq legislation, the
Wilmington (Delaware) Education Association (NEA affili-
ate) made a formal request, in January, 1968, to obtain
a professional negotiations agreement for the profession-
121
al staff of the district. Very soon after this action,
a similar request wrs filed by the rival Wilmington
Federation of Teachers (AFT, AFL-CIO affiliate) . After
much discussion and investigation the Board of Educa-
tion in Wilmington, at its June, 1968, meeting adopted
a resolution supporting the formulation of a bargaining
122
agreerv t wits the teachers.
119Chapter 13, Title 19, Delaware Code.
^ 20Ibid. Section 1301 (b) (2)
.
^ 2
^Letter, Wilmington Education Association to
Wilmington Board of Education, January 26, 1968.
122
Minutes of Public Meeting, Board of Public
Education in Wilmington, June 3, 1968.
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In the Game month, the Attorney General of Del-
aware issued an opinion indicating that the school
boards do not possess the authority to enter into a
legally binding collective bargaining agreement with
123
teachers. The Wilmington Board apparently not
satisfied with the decision and not ready to back away
from its announced intentions to negotiate with its
teachers, requested a supporting opinion from the legal
officer of the city of Wilmington, the City Solicitor.
In the opinion returned by the City Solicitor of Wilm-
ington, collective negotiations were considered to be a
legal activity in which the Board had the authority to
participate. To quote the ruling:
It is the opinion of this office that
under presently existing Delaware law
the Board of Public Education in Wilm-
ington is not prohibited from entering
into collective bargaining negotiations
and agreements with properly qualified
teach€;rs ' associations .124
With the City Solicitor’s legal support the Wilm-
ington Board moved ahead and conducted a representation
election in December, 1968. The Wilmington Federation
of Teachers (AFT, AFL-CIO) was elected and recognized
as the exclusive representative of the teachers in Wilm-
ington. Unconfirmed reports of legal action against
123
Opinion, Attorney General of Delaware,
June 12, 1968.
1240pinion, City Solicitor of Wilmington, Del.,
July 23, 1968.
^•^Wilmington Evening Jotirnal , September, 17, 1969.
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the Wilmington Board of Education were heard by this
writer. No such activity materialized, the Wilm-
ington Board fulfilled its original intentions.
In September, 1969, the teachers in the city
of Wilmington, Delaware began their year working
under the terms of a negotiated agreement between
the Wilmington Federation of Teachers and the Board
of Public Education in Wilmington. This took place
in the absence of any supporting legislation. In the
next month, October, 1969, the state legislature
approved a statute establishing the legal frame for
negotiations and relations between boards of education
126and organizations of public school employees.
As will be shown, later in the study, many of
the other school districts in the state have now be-
come involved in collective negotiations with their
employees. The involvement is still not in all school
districts of Delaware and the process did not start
immediately in many of the districts which are current
ly negotiating.
The Delaware Statute
The Act itself is the result of the efforts of
the most active teacher organization in the state, the
126
14 Del. C. Ch. 40.
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NEA affiliated Delaware Education Association. Typical
of the earlier reported observation, NEA affiliates do
not encourage the use of strong "pro labor" language
in legislation. As a result of the NEA drive the
Delaware statute identifies the bargaining process as
"professional negotiations. 1,127
The actual purpose of the Act is as follows:
To promote the improvement of personnel
management and employer-employee relation-
ships within the public school system by
recognizing the right of the public em-
ployees to join organizations of their own
choice and be represented by such organi-
zations in their professional and employ-
ment relationships with Boards of Educ-
ation. To this end, a free and open ex-
change of views between the Board of Educ-
ation of the school district and public
school employees is deemed desirable and
in the public interest. 128
The scope of negotiations includes salaries,
employee benefits, working conditions and other issues
if agreed upon by mutual consent. 129 The Act excludes
130
all administrative • arsonnel. Non certificated
employees still bargain under the Title 19 Statute
cited earlier.
Other areas of the statute reflecting the "non-
labor" or "professional approach" to collective negoti-
127
Ibid. Section 4003 (b)
178
Ibid. Section 4002
1 70J Ibid. Section 4008
l on
Ibid. Section 4001 (a)
131
19 Del. Code Chapter 13
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ations are the lack of a provision for unfair labor
practices and the prohibition of the "union shop." 132
The administrative bodies responsible for monitoring
the process are the State and local school boards. 133
Strikes are prohibited and are loosely defined
134
as an unexcused absence." Binding arbitration
or decision-making by a third party or parties can
not be specified directly or indirectly in the agree-
,
135
ment
.
Therefore, one can rightfully conclude that the
labor relations environment for Delaware teachers is
moderate. Using a scale of "1" to "10" with pro
labor forces at "10" and anti-labor forces at "1",
this writer would rate the environment at "4." This
is a position leaning slightly away from the current
national trend being supported by the teacher organi-
zations .
The State supports negotiations by law, but the
general reaction to the process is less than enthusi-
astic. The chief state school administrator, the
person who set 3 the leadership climate for the operation
of all of the public schools in the state, speaking at
132
14 Del Code. Section 4003 (a)
1 IT
Ibid. Section 4004
134
Ibid. Section 4011 (c)
135
Ibid. Section 4008 (c)
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a negotiations conference had this reaction:
,
The fear I have about negotiations atthis point is that many teachers spend far
too much time in the process, (collective
negotiations) with the result that too
little time is spent in preparation for
classroom responsibilities I think
schools for some time to come will be worse
run than they have been in the past and
that all in all quality will be downgraded
instead of improved. 136
Negotiations are now a fact for the public school
teachers of Delaware. This writer will attempt to find
an answer to the question, has collective negotiations
had an effect on the salaries of the teachers?
Summary
Teachers are now involved in collective negoti-
ations primarily because of the desire for wages and
benefits comparable to those in the private sector.
Secondly, teachers now look upon the process as an
acceptable practice for professional educators. This
bargaining activity has been spurred on by the efforts
of two teacher organisations, the National Education
Association (NEA) and the American Federation of
Teachers (AFT)
.
The NEA and AFT were markedly dissimilar in origin
and structure. However, over the years they have be-
come much alike in approaches to negotiations. Each
organization has accepted similar tactics in negotiat-
75
ions arc practically identical.
Although the strength of the current negotiations
activity comes from the successful bargaining efforts
of the New York City teachers in 1961, the liter-
ature shows that teacher group action for profession-
al and personal gains started as early as the 1800's.
It is not the collective activity of the teachers
that is new, it is the open and public militant way
of dealing with working conditions and salaries that
is a recent phenomena ,
.
The teacher organizations are pushing to gain
federal legislation in support of collective bar-
gaining in public education. This would bring about
two changes. First, it would make it possible to
have uniform procedures in all of the states. Secondly,
it would make it possible for many teachers not pre-
sently involved to have the right to negotiate their
salaries and working conditions. There is opposition
to both federal legislation and bargaining for teachers.
This study ^as made possible and the establishment
of teachers' salaries through collective negotiations
has been made easier, because of the acceptance of a
uniform guide known as the single salary schedule. The
guide is used to determine the compensation level by
using the professional preparation and years of teach-
ing experience as points of reference.
76The final point made in this chapter was that
Delaware is a state with a statute granting teachers
the right to negotiate. The Delaware Act lists the
scope of negotiations to include salaries, employee
benefits, working conditions and other issues if
agreed upon by mutual consent. Prohibited are strikes,
union shops and binding arbitration. The Act makes
no provisions for unfair labor practices.
The preceding information has been presented as
a review of the conditions leading up to the current
negotiations climate in Delaware. It will also serve
as the point of reference for the findings and con-
clusions of this study.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
Overview
In Chapter II the historical and legal' aspects of
the bargaining process in the public schools were re-
viewed. The chapter furnished a brief description of
the conditions associated with collective negotiations
in public education. Also identified and examined
were the roles of the National Education Association
and the American Federation of Teachers in the drive to
get increased teacher participation in the decision
making process surrounding working conditions and
salaries. In summary, the second chapter provided the
background data for the study.
This the third chapter will describe the data
sources of the study, give an overview of the data
collected and discuss the treatment of those data.
Included will be a review of the components of the
questionnaire used to collect the data. Finally, this
chapter will describe the methods and procedures used
to establish the relationship between the collected
data, the findings and conclusions of the study.
Data Collection Methods
The data for this study were collected xn
three
78phases. The first phase consisted of a search of
past salary records of the twenty
-six (26) school
districts in the state of Delaware. Information from
the salary schedules of the Delaware State Board of
Education (state salary schedule) has been included for
use as a reference scale in the analysis stage of this
study.
Salary data collected were limited to the nine
(9) school years beginning in 1965-1966 and ending
with the year 1974-1975. These salary data were found
in the files of the Delaware Education Association,
the Wilmington Federation of Teachers and the archives
of the Wilmington Public Schools.
Phase two consisted of data collection through
the use of a questionnaire designed to determine the
following
:
1. the degree of negotiation activity in
the development of each school district's
salary schedules,
2. the nature and extent of any job action
(strike) in each school district,
3. changes in the structure of the district's
salary schedule,
4. factors in a specific school district that
also may have had an impact on salaries
along with collective negotiations.
In phase three of the collection process, follow-
up interviews were conducted for the purpose of clari-
fying data submitted on the questionnaire. These in-
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terviews were limited to (1) respondents submitting
incomplete or conflicting information and (2) respon-
dents in districts showing salary increases that
appeared to be inconsistent with other information
submitted
.
Information gained from each of the three data
collection phases was cross-referenced to avoid errors.
Through the use of this system it was possible to
correct inconsistencies and verify the accuracy of the
data presented.
The Respondent Population
The respondent population fc the present study
consisted of the school administrator in each Delaware
public school district who had the knowledge of, or
actually constructed, the teachers' salary schedule.
Each public school district in the state of Delaware
is a part of the total population.
A quo tionnaire was sent to the personnel admin-
istrator in each of the twenty-six (26) public school
districts in Delaware. This writer, as Director of
Personnel and Employee Relations, supplied the informa-
tion for the Wilmington Public Schools. The individuals
in the respondent population were selected because of
their usual involvement in salary preparation. They
were identified from the Educational Directory of the
State of Delaware, 1974-1975.
All twenty-five (25) questionnaires were returned.
The twenty-sixth district was the district of this
writer. This represents a return of one hundred percent
(100.%) After clarification interviews, all of the data
were usable. This high rate of return is possibly the
result of two situations (1) the writer's personal in-
volvement with the Delaware Association of Personnel
Administrators; and (2) the small size of the population.
It was possible to appeal directly to respondents who
failed to return the instrument within a reasonable
period of time.
The final respondents fc;r this study include
personnel officers, and superintendents of the district.
Confidentiality was not a problem because all of the
information submitted is in the public domain.
The Questionnair
An attempt was made to locate a suitable quest-
ionnaire for obtaining the data needed for this study.
After a careful investigation it was determined that
such an instrument was not available. This writer then
developed the questionnaire used to collect the data.
The method of development is described in the follow-
ing sections.
Questionn . i re Item s
The self-administered questionnaire was designed
to determine:
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1. general district information,
2. district's acceptance of an exclusive
negotiating representative,
3. state affiliation of organization
representing teaching staff,
4. degree of teacher involvement in
salary schedule development,
5 . if district has a written agreement
with teachers' organization,
6. degree of teacher collective negotiation
activity in district,
7. nature of job actions (strikes) in the
district,
8. changes in salary schedule structure,
9. opinion of the respondent concerning the
effects of collective negotiations on
teachers' salaries,
10.
opinion of the respondent concerning
factors in the district that have hid a
greater impact on teachers' salaries
than collective negotiations.
The questionnaire was designed to obtain short,
uncomplicated, closed responses. Applicable responses
were listed on the questionnaire offering the respon-
dent an opportunity to check an answer or to identify
a prerecorded answer. Five questions did offer an oppor-
tunity for the respondent to expand the answer if nec-
essary.
The respondents in this population usually par-
ticipate in many surveys and studies, consuming large
amounts of time. For this reason the questionnaire
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was designed to collect all of the data needed in a
minimum amount of time. The instrument can be found
in Appendix A.
Development of the Questionna ire
The data collection instrument was developed and
finalized after seven months of preliminary drafts.
The initial draft was developed after extensive read-
ing of the literature which determined the information
necessary to complete the study.
The second draft was reviewed and critizod by
members of the Wilmington Schools staff and members of
the School of Education, University of Massachussets
.
The instrument was finalized after a pilot test review
by five administrators in school districts in Delaware.
This writer's dissertation committee members evaluated
the final questionnaire before its release to the target
school districts.
Treatment of the Data
Treatment of the data was kept as uncomplicated
as possible. Several statistical approaches were in-
vestigated as possible methods of treating these data.
After much consideration it was decided by this writer
that the determination of a percentage change in salary
could be computed and be valid without an elaborate
statistical formula.
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The study was designed to determine the relation-
ship between collective negotiations and salaries of
teachers. More specifically, the investigation deter-
mined the effects of the independent variable collective
negotiations on the dependent variable percent of change
of the teachers' salaries in the public schools of
Delaware.
Using a computer for convenience and time it was
possible to extract the following information for each
of the twenty-six school districts:
1. in each district, the annual salary percentage
change.
2. in each district, the percentage change in
salary during the negotiating years and
also the non-negotiating years.
3. in each district, the overall district
percentage change for the entire period
of the study.
In order to determine the annual percentage change
1
for each district, fifteen (15) salary figures were
taken from each of the nine (9) annual salary schedules
of that district. The annual change was determined by
1
The sampl s includes the zero experience level,
five year level and maximum experience levels for eacn
of the following educational levels: Bachelor degree.
Bachelor degree + thirty additional credits. Master s
degree. Master's degree plus 30 additional credits an
Doctorate degree level.
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computing the average annual increase of the total
sample in dollars. The average increase was converted
from dollars to percent, the unit of comparison used
throughout this study.
The same procedure was used to compute the per-
centage change of salary for the negotiating years and
non-negotiating years in each district. Each of the
twenty-six (26) public school districts in Delaware
were classified according to negotiation status. Nego-
tiating and non-negotiating years were identified within
each district and the appropriate salary samples were
used in the computations.
The districts' overall percentage change is a
composite of all of the annual percentage changes over
the period of the study. It represents the arithmetical
mean of the nine annual pe- rentage changes. This per-
centage figure is used as the reference point for each
district's comparisons.
The analysis process consisted of several compari-
sons. In this phase of the study the following procedur-
es were completed:
1. In each district, the salary percentage changes
for the negotiating years were compared with
the changes in the non-negotiating years.
2. In each district a comparison was made to
determine the number of times that the annual
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percentage change for the negotiating years
and also the non-negotiating years were
above or below the district's overall
salary percentage change.
3. To determine the effects of a job action on
teachers' salaries, the annual salary per-
centage change in a year when that district's
teachers conducted a job action was compared
with the district overall salary percentage
change. A comparison was made to determine
if the change in a job action year, was above
or below the overall district percentage
change
.
4. In each district the structure of the salary
schedules in the negotiating years was com-
pared with the schedules in non-negotiating
years. The following situations were in-
vestigated:
a. Were experience levels added or deleted?
b. Were education levels added or deleted?
c. Were longevity levels added or deleted?
5.
An analysis was made from additional informat-
ion collected (1) to determine the number of
times that budget defeats prevented salary
raises; and (2) to determine additional
factors associated with the effects of col-
lective negotiations on the salaries of
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teachers. This process was accomplished
through survey questions on the question-
naire
.
I
Results of Data Analysis
The results of the data analysis have been display-
ed in tables in Chapter IV. The information has been re-
viewed and analyzed in an effort to support hypothesis
listed earlier in this study.
Summary and Conclusions
The summary and conclusions were developed after
a review of the literature, and an extensive analysis of
the data. Included in the summary is a review of the
process used to collect the dr.ta and a composite of the
findings. The total problem has been summarized prior
to offering final conclusions in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
In Chapter III, the population of the study is
described; the data collect on process and the treatment
of that data are discussed. A description of the com-
ponents of the self-administered questionnaire is in-
cluded in the chapter. Finally, the chapter established
the relationship between the collected data, the findings
and the conclusions of the study.
Chapter IV presents a detailed analysis of the data,
related to the effects of collective negotiations on the
salaries of the teachers in Delaware. There are two
sections in this chapter.
The first section contains an analysis of the in-
formation gained in the search of the records and files
of the Delaware teacher organizations. Included are
data from the questionnaire dealing directly with salary
and the salary schedules.
The second section will be limited to an analysis
of the responses and findings of the opinion and
survey
questions included in the questionnaire.
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The Data from the Questionnaire
General In formation Concerning
Districts in This Study
The population of this study included all of the
twenty-six (26) public school districts in the state of
Delaware. In Table I
,
data are presented showing that
twenty-three or 88.4 percent of the twenty-six districts
are considered to be negotiating school districts; each
district has been so classified for not less than three
years. Fifteen or 57.6 percent of the districts have
reported five years or more of negotiations activities
with its teacher organization.
Exclusive recognition1 exists in twenty-five or
96.1 percent of the districts. The Delaware State Edu-
cation Association (NEA affiliate) is the exclusive re-
presentative of the teachers in twenty-two or 84.6 per-
cent of the districts; the Delaware Federation of Teachers
(AFT affiliate) represents two or 7 .6 percent of the dis-
tricts; and the independent organization, the Delcastle
Teachers Association, has the exclusive status in one
district. The remaining single district has not accepted
an exclusive representative for its teachers.
Twenty-three or 88.4 percent of the school districts
in this study currently have a written
agreement, eacn
containing a grievance procedure and signed by
represent-
^Exclusive recognition is the acceptance (recog-
in negotiations.
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atives of the teacher organization. Twenty-two or
84.6 percent of these agreements include the salary
schedule as a part of the signed negotiated document.
Summary
The data appear to indicate that collective nego-
tiation has been accepted in the Delaware school districts.
This 1 is evidenced by signed, written agreements containing
grievance procedures. The negotiated documents contain
salary schedules
.
More than half ( : 7.6 percent) of the Delaware ne-
gotiating districts hav.. negotiated for five years or more.
Twenty-three or 88.4 pc rcent of the district.: have nego-
tiated for not less than three years.
The findings support this writer's earlier state-
ments that (1) Delaware schcc I distric s have been ne-
gotiating with its teachers for at least five years; (2)
there are years when negotiating districts can be com-
pared with non-negotiating districts; and (3) the negoti-
ating districts in this study have both negotiating and
non-negotiating years during the period of the study.
The negotiating districts have written, signed agree-
ments with grievetnee procedures. Th.se factor: give support
to a true negotiation situation of give-and-take, from
both
parties. The final acknowledgement on the part of the
board
of education that the teachers' terns have been
accepted is
the signature on the agreement and th urn orstanding
that
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grievances can be instituted if the terms are not followed.
Analysis of Data on Salaries and Negotiations
This particular study was designed to determine
the effect collective negotiations have had on the per-
centage change of salaries of public school teachers. The
first hypothesis statement specifically declares that
teachers who bargain collectively cause their salaries
to increase by a higher percentage during the years of
bargaining than during years prior to the bargaining pro-
cess. The data explaining this first statement are pre-
sented in Tables 2, and 3.
Table 2 presents data showing the analysis of the
percentage change of salaries in ach negotiating district.
A comparison is made between the salary pore. 'age change in
negotiating years and salary percentage change in non-
negotiating years.
The results do not support the hypothesis staged
above. The data clearly indicate that in a majority of the
districts, higher percentage gains were evident in non-
negotiating years rather than in negotiating years as was
projected in the hypothesis statement.
As was cited e; 'lier, twenty-three or 88.4
percent
of the Delaware public school districts are
considered
negotiating districts. One negotiating district
is new,
has no period without negotiations and has
not been included
in Tables 2 and 3.
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The data show that in a comparison, between the
annual percentage change of saliiry in negotiating years,
with the gains in the non-negotiating years, only three
or 13.6 percent of the twenty-two reported negotiating
districts had a higher annual percent change in the
negotiating years. The remaining nineteen (86.4 percent)
districts all had higher annual gains in non-negotiating
years
.
Sixteen or 72.7 percent of the negotiating districts
reported the highest single annual percentage gain in a
non-negotiating year. Fourteen or 63.6 percent of the
negotiating school districts reported their lowest annual
percentage change in a negotiating year. Eight of these
districts actually show a year during the negotiation period
in which there was no increase in salary.
Using a different approach to test the same hypoth-
esis, this investigator counted the number of times that
a district's annual salary percentage change in both the
negotiating and non-negotiating years was above the dis-
trict's overall percentage change. The procedure was re-
peated to determine the number of times that the district’s
annual percentage change fell below the overall percentage
change for the district.
Table 3 lists the number and percentages of nego-
tiating and non-negotiating years where the annual
gams
for each district were above or below the district
overall
percentage change. These data confirmed the
results of
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the earlier test in that they fail to support the ori-
ginal hypothesis.
During the negotiating years, only four of the
reported twenty-two districts had percentage gains in
salary above the district overall percentage. This is
a low 18.1 percent. Four other districts had the same
number of annual gains above the district overall per-
centage as the number below the overall increase.
In the non-negotiating years, nine or 40.9 percent
of the districts show an annual percentage change in
salary above the district overall increase. Six other
districts reported the same number of annual percentage
gains above the district overall increase as below the
district overall percentage gain in salary.
Summary
This study tested the hypothesis that collective
negotiations by teachers would produce higher percentage
gains in salary than were produced prior to such negoti-
ation activity. Two approaches were used to obtain data
to test the hypothesis.
The first test actually compared a district's an- .
nual percentage change of salary in the negotiating
years with the district's annual percentage change in
non-negotiating years. The second approach compared the
number of times that an annual salary percentage gain
was
above or below the districts overall percentage change.
In both situations it was shown that collective
negoti-
ations wore not followed by higher percentage
gains.
96
Comparing the district's annual percentage change
in salary in the negotiating years with the change in
the non-negotiating years, the data show that only three
or 13.6 percent of the twenty negotiating districts have
higher annual percent change in the negotiating years.
Sixteen or 72.7 percent of the negotiating districts had
the highest single annual percentage gain iri a non-negoti-
ating year. At the same time it was reported that the
lowest annual percentage gain was in a negotiating year
for 63.6 percent of the districts.
An analysis of the results showed that a comparison
of average change in negotiating years with that of
the non-negotiating years; or a comparison of the
number of times that i nnual overall percent gains are
above or below the district overall gain; each enerally
support the conclusion that collective negotiati os did
not produce the expected highe.- percentage gains in
salary in most districts; a small percentage (13.6) of
the districts did show gains.
These findings support the earlier work by Landon
and Baird (1972)
2
who reported mixed results from collect-
ive negotiations. Their studies showed that collective
negotiations proved to be a significant factor in some
school districts and insignificant in other districts.
2
Baird and Landon
Bargaining on Public Sc.
"The Effects of Collective
tool Teachers' Salaries,' p. 417.
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One possible weakness in the findings of this study
is the nature of the recorded salary data. School dis-
tricts in Delaware receive a major portion of a teacher's
salary from a state allocation to the district. The
portion of the annn 1 salary raise directly affected by
district action represents approximately two percent of
the annu,al salary.
The state portion of the teacher pay raise has
equaled approximately four to five percent of the teach-
ers annual salary. Consequently, in those years when the
state legislature failed to legislate (twice in the last
three years) pay raises, many districts reflect small
percentage increases. Eight dis! : cts actually had no
gain in salary during negotiating years when the state
failed to appropriate pay raises
.
The above situation did produce low pay raises,
thereby lowering the district annual percentage increase
during some negotiating years. However, it does reinforce
the finding that collective negotiations do not
generally
produce higher percentages of increase in salary.
The Second Hypothesis
This hypothesis states that the percentage
of
salary increase in a school district will be
higher rn a
year when teachers conduct a job act n for
salaries than
in years without a job action by teachers.
As can be seen in Table 4, five
districts of the
twenty-six districts (19.2) have reported
job actions.
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One district reported activity in two different years.
Two of the districts reporting, indicated that
salary was not the issue in the strike. One district
reported a salary increase, after the job action, higher
than the district overall gains. The other districts
recorded low percentage gains with one district indi-
cating that the striking teachers received no salary
increase
.
Summary
This investigator was not able to reach any definite
conclusion from the data because of the small percentage of
districts reporting. However, the data presented appear
not to support the hypothesis. The percentage of salary
increase is small and generally below the disLrict overall
salary increases.
The Third Hypo 'asis
The third hypothesis states that collective negoti-
ations have not caused a change in the structure of teach-
ers' salary schedules. The data relating to the
components
of the schedule are listed in Tables 5, 6, and 7.
Table 5 presents information on the experience
levels. Table 6 shows information on the education
levels;
Table 7 relates to longevity levels.
A review of Table 5 data indicates that
two hundred
twenty-eight schedules were constructed during
the period
covered by the study. Two hundred eight
(91.2 percent) were
prepared without a change in experience
levels. The remain
TABLE 5
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NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF CHANGE IN EXPERIENCE LEVELS
ON THE SALARY SCHEDULES OF TEACHERS IN PUBLIC
SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF DELAWARE
Responses Made (N=228)
&
Response Number Percent
Number of changes adding
experience levels to
salary schedules during
negotiating years in a
district
.
11 4.8%
Number of changes drop-
ping .experience levels
from salary schedules
during negotiating years
in a district. 2 0.9%
Number of c‘; nges adding
experience levels to
salary schedules during
non-negotiating years in
a district. 6 2.6%
Number of changes drop-
ping experience level:;
from salary schedules
during non-negotiating
years in a district. 1 0 . 5%
Number of salary schedule
preparations without
change in experience
levels
.
208 92.2%
Total 228 100.0%
Note
:
responses.
aEach schoo3. district had nine (9) possible
each year of the study exceptone for
Kent County Vocational-Technical (8) ; and New
Castle
County Vocational-Technical (4)
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ing twenty (8.8 percent) schedules did show a change in
experience levels.
In Table 6, the data indicate that only twelve or 5.3
percent of the possible 228 schedule changes resulted in
different educational levels. Two hundred sixteen (94.7
percent) schedules retained the same educational levels.
Longevity levels changed on sixteen (7 percent) of
the schedules. Two hundred twelve or 92.9 percent of the
salary schedules had no change in the number of longevity
levels. This information is displayed in Table 7.
Summary
The data tend to indicate that there v;as a change in
a small number (7.0 pc . nnt) representing forty-eight of a
poc. ible six hundred eighty-four schedules during the entire
period of line study. During negotiating years, there were
changes in structure in 4.3 percent of the schedules.
The largest change occurred in negotiating districts
when experience levels were added to the eleven different
schedules; experience levels were dropped from two schedules.
Eight negotiating schedules or 3.6 percent added longevity
steps; two (.09 percent) schedules lost longevity levels.
Also during negotiations, educational levels were added to
seven schedules.
Considering that each of the twenty-six districts had
an opportunity to construct nine new salary schedules,
eight to eleven total changes is not a very large
number
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TABLE 6
NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF CHANGE IN EDUCATIONAL LEVELS
ON THE SALARY SCHEDULES OF TEACH? RS IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF DELAWARE
Response
a
Responses Made (N=228)
Number Percent
Number of changes adding
educational levels to
salary schedules during
a districts negotiating
years. 7
Number of changes drop-
ping educational levels
from salary schedrle
during negotiating years
in a district. 0
Number of changes adding
educational levels to
salary schedules di'-.ring
non-negotiating years in
a district. 3
Number of changes drop-
ping educational levels
during non-negotiating
years in a district. *
Number of salary schedule
preparations without
chanqe in educational
levels.
3.0%
0 . 0%
1.4%
0.9%
94.7%
Total 228 100 . 0%
Note
:
aEach school district had nine (9) possible res
ponses, one for each year of the study with the
exception
of Kent County Vocational-Technical (8) and
New Castle
County Vocational—Technical (4)
.
TABLE 7
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NUMBER AND PERCENTAGES OF CHANGE IN LONGEVITY STEPS (LEVELS)
ON THE SALARY SCHEDULES OF THE TEACHERS IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF DELAWARE
Response
Responses Made
Nu 'ber
(N=228) a
Percent
Number of changes adding
longevity steps to the
salary schedules during
a districts negotiating
years
.
8 3.6%
Number of changes drop-
ping longevity steps from
the salary schedules
during negotiating years
in a district. 2 .9%
Number of changes adding
longevity steps to the sal-
ary schedules during non-
negotiating years in a
district. 6 2 . 6%
Number of changes dropping
longevity steps from the
salary schedules during
non-negotiating years in
a district. 0 .0%
Number of salary schedule
preparations without
change in longevity levels. 212 92.9%
Total 228 100.0%
Note:
aEach district
for each year of the s
Technical (8) and New
had nine (9) possible responses, one
tudy except Kent County Vocational-
Castle County Vocational-Technical
( 4 ) .
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of changes. The schedules therefore, remained rather
constant in form and structure in 94.7 percent of the
schedules constructed. The findings tend to support the
hypothesis that collective negotiations have not caused
the form and structure of the salary schedule to change.
This writer requested that the respondent identify
years in which a budget referendum defeat prevented a
salary raise in the respondent's district. Only two
(7.6 percent) of the possible 220 salary schedules were
identified as being so affected. In non -negotiating years
five (19.2 percent) salary schedules were prepared without
pay raises resulting from a budget defeat. Table 8 dis-
plays these data. It is to be noted that 96.9 percent of
the salary scl vdules prepared during the period of this
study were not affected by a salary referendum defeat.
Summary
District budget referenda defeats affecting salary
raises were practically non-existent in Delaware during
the period of this study. Two such defeats were reported
as occurring during negotiating years and five during non-
negotiating years.
The findings from this question suggest that budget
defeats have not had any great effect on the salary sched-
ules of the Delaware teachers. However, the information
collected is not sufficient to form definite conclusions.
TABLE 8
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NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF BUDGET DEFEATS WHICH
PREVENTED SALARY RAISES FOR TEACHERS IN
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF DELAWARE
Responses Made (N=228) a
Response Number Percent
Number of budget defeats
preventing salary raises
during negotiating years. 2 .9%
Number of budget defeats
preventing salary raises
during non-negotiating
years
.
5 2.2%
Salary schedules not af-
fected by budget refer-
endum defeat. 221 96.9%
Total 228 100.0%
Note: Each school district
responses
,
one for each year
County Vocational -Technical
Vocationat-Technical (4)
.
had nine (9) possible
of the study except Kent
(8) and New Castle County
Opinion Questions
Three questions were presented to determine the
opinions of the respondents concerning the effects of
collective negotiations on teachers' salaries. The
responses from these opinion questions are being
used
as a barometer to determine if the findings of
this
study reflect what is actually occurring in
the school
districts
.
The first question. What would be your
reaction
TABLE 9
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RESULT OF THE RESPONSE TO TIIE QUESTION, "WHAT WOULD BE YOUR
REACTION TO THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: THE SALARIES
OF THE TEACHERS IN MY DISTRICT WOULD HAVE
ESCALATED AT A SIMILAR RATE WITHOUT
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS .
"
Response
Response
Number
Made (N=26)
Percent
Strong support 8 30.7%
Mildly support 7 26.9%
Mildly oppose 4 15.04%
Strongly oppose 4 15.04%
No opinion 3 11.6%
Total 26 100.0%
to the following statement? The salaries of the teachers
in my (respondc?nt) district would have escalated at a
similar rate without collective negotiations.
In Table 9, fifteen (57.6 percent) of those respond-
ing supported the statement as presented. Strong
support
was expressed by eight (30.7 percent) and the remaining
seven gave mild support.
Eight (30.7 percent) of the respondents did not
agree with the statement; three respondents
gave "no
opinion" as an answer.
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Summary
The statement that salaries would have escalated in
the district of the respondent at a similar rate without
collective negotiations, received support from the major-
ity (57.6 percent) of the participants in the study.
Three "no opinion" answers were given and the remaining
eight (30.8 percent) answered in opposition to the state-
ment .
These responses tend to reflect the findings from
the test on the first hypothesis. Salaries did show
similar rates of escalation without negotiations as they
did after the negotiation process began. The value of
this question was to collect information from individuals
who have first hand knowledge of the effects of collective
negotiations in each district. The reformation was used
to check the accuracy of the results of the study.
Results from the question, "In your opinion what ef-
fects have collective negotiations had on teachers' sala-
ries?", can be seen in Table 10. Of those responding,
four
(15.4 percent) felt that collective negotiations have
had
a "very strong" effect on teachers' salaries.
Seven (26.9
percent) of the respondents indicate a belief that
the ef-
fect of collective negotiation on the salaries
was strong.
Responding to the term "mild effect" were seven
participants ; an additional six answers were
recorded in the
•very mild" category. This gives a total
of thirteen (49.9
108
TABLE 10
RESULT OF THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION, "IN YOUR OPINION,
WHAT EFFECTS HAVE COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS HAD ON
TEACHERS ' SALARIES?
"
Responses Made (N=26)
Responr e Number Percent
Very strong 4 15.4%
Strong 7 26.9%
Mild 7 26.9%
Very mild 6 23.0%
None 1 3.9%
No response 1 3.9%
Total 26 100.0%
percent) of the participants supporting a position that col
lective negotiations have had a mild effect on teachers
salaries. Of the twenty-six respondents only one
indicated
that collective negotiations have had no effect on the
sal-
aries of teachers. One respondent did not answer
this
question. The above opinions are consistent with
the finds
of the study. A few districts did record
increases in ne-
gotiating years higher than non-negotiating
years.
Summary
The data tend to indicate that the
respondents support
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the position giving collective negotiations credit for
having affected teachers salaries to some degree. Only
one respondent opposed this position.
The largest number of responses (49.9 percent)
placed the effects in the mild and very mild range.
However, those supporting the strong and very strong
position equaled 43.3 percent of the administrators in-
cluded in the sample.
No attempt will be made by this writer to judge the
merits of the opinions of mild versus strong. It can be
said that approximately 93 percent of the respondents be-
lieve that collective negotiations have played at lease a
minimum role in determining the salary levels of teachers.
Data from Open Question
The open question requested that the respondent
identify factors in the district that have had a greater
impact on teachers' salaries than collective
negotiations.
Several items were listed but the frequency of
the respon-
ses was small. Table 11 lists the data for
this question.
Respondents included items such as cost of
living,
voter opposition to more taxes and a new
outlook on teacher
salaries. The nature or the direction of
the impact of
most of the listed items could not be
determined since the
responses were suggested without comment.
The response showing the greatest
frequency was “none
Thirteen (48.2 percent) of the respondents
expressed the
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TABLE 11
RESULT OF THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION, "IN YOUR OPINION
WHAT FACTOR IN YOUR DISTRICT IIAS HAD A GREATER
IMPACT ON TEACHERS' SALARIES THAN
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS?
"
Responses Made (N=27)
Response Frequency Percent
Cost of living index 3 11.1%
Voter opposition to taxes 3 11.1%
State and local financing
laws 1 3.7%
New board mergers 2 7.4%
Teacher shortages 1 3.7%
New outlook on teacher
salaries 2 7.4%
New superintendent 2 7.4%
None 13 48 . 2%
Total 27 100.0%
opinion that there was no factor that has had a greater
impact on teachers' salaries than collective negotiations.
Summary
This writer will not attempt to form a definite
conclusion because of the small number of
responses in this
category. However, there is an indication
from answers
given to this question that there are other
factors which
must bo investigated before assessing
definite impact of
collective negotiations.
Ill
In an attempt to identify the years in which the
annual average salary percentage change was above or be-
low the district overall average some related data be-
came apparent. These data resulted from comparisons
between the districts
'
percentage change and the state
salary percentage changes.
‘ The data resulting from these comparisons are
presented in Table 12 . In the two years that the state
of Delaware failed to appropriate money for teacher pay
3
raises as described earlier in Chapter I, all twenty-
six school districts had their lowest percentage gains
in salary. The comparisons showed that in nine instances
the district gave no pay raises if the state did not legis-
late a pay raise.
In the year of the third lowest percentage salary
increase legislated by the state of Delaware, nineteen
or 79.1 percent of the districts reported a low
percentage
change in salary at the district level. The
comparison
also showed that in two of the high gain years
at the
state level, high increases were received in
the districts
In one of the high gain years for the
state, twenty
3
Supra, Footnote 26, Chapter I
TABLE 12
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A COMPARISON OP LOW AND HIGH PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF TEACHER
SALARIES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF DETAWARE
WITH THE LEGISLATED STATE SATARY SCHEDULES
FOR THE PERIOD 1966-1975
School
Year
66
67
67
68
68
69
69
70
70
71
71
• 72
72
73
73
74
74
75
State L H II I Z • H LZ
District
1 L H H H L L
2 L H II H L L
3 L H H H L L
4 L H H H L L
5 L II H H L L
6 L H H H L L
7 L H H II L L
8 L H II H L L
9 L H H H L L
10 L II H IP H
LZ
11 L H H LZ H L
12 H H II L L
TjZ
13 L H II II L
z L
14 L H H H L L
15 L H II II L
L
T Z
16 L II H II L
17 L II H H L
Z L
18 L H H H L
11
L
19 II L
L
20 II L II 11 L
II
L
21
2 2
L
L
H
II II
II
II
L
lz
L
L
23 L II H H Li
L
24
25
26
L
L
II
H
H
H
II
II
L
II
H
H
L
L
lz
L
L
L
L
(L) The lowest percentage
in salary.
changes
(H) The highest percentage
in salary.
2 changes
(z) Zero percent ot change in
salary.
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three (92 percent) districts recorded high gains. In
the second such year high increases resulted in 80
percent of the districts.
Summary
When high salary increases are legislated on the
state of Delaware salary schedule, high increases are
reflected in the districts. Low increases in salary or
no increase through legislation produce low salary in-
creases at the district level.
This phenomenon suggests the strong influence of
state salary legislation :‘n Delaware. It suggests that
legislation plays an important role in establishing salary
levels for the teachers of Delaware. These results show
that in Delaware, the legislated salary increases at the
state level have caused salary percentages to increase
more often and with a greater degree of predictability
than collective negotiations activities.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter IV presents a detailed analysis of the data
relating. to the effects of collective negotiations on the
salaries of the teachers in Delaware. The data describes
the percentage change in salaries during the negotiating
and non-negotiating years in Delaware school districts.
Also included in Chapter IV is a complete display of the
findings of this study.
The information in Chapter V will bring the entire
study into focus through summary conclusions and recommend-
ations. The first section of the chapter is the overall
summary identifying the various relationships made apparent
through the review of the literature and the data* analysis.
This section will be followed by conclusions reached from
the findings. After the conclusions have been presented,
recommendations will be set forth.
Collective Negot iations
Climate in the Delawe re
Public School Districts,
The data appear to indicate that Delaware
has a
favorable climate for collective negotiations
in education.
The first indication of such a climate
was the presence of a
state statute (Title 14, section 40 Delaware
Code) permitting
115
collective negotiations by teachers.
Another indication that the climate for negotiations
was favorable is the fact that the school boards in twenty-
five (96.1 percent) of the twenty-six school districts
have accepted an organization to serve as an exclusive
negotiating representative for the teachers. The data
seem to support the statement that true negotiations are
occurring in districts that do bargain collectively.
Further support of the negotiating climate is the
presence of the elements of bargaining in twenty—two (95.6
percent) of the twenty-three negotiating districts. These
elements include signed written agreements and grievance
procedures
.
More than half (fifteen or 57.6 percent) of the
Delaware negotiating districts have negotiated for five
years or more. Twenty-three: or 88.4 percent of the
dis-
tricts have negotiated for not less than three years.
Collective Negot.iations
and Teacher Salaries
The overall purpose of this study was to
investi-
gate the effect that collective negotiations
has had on
the percentage change in salaries of
public school teach
ers. Specifically, the research
question asked if tench
ers who bargain collectively cause
their salaries to in-
crea: ,o by a higher percentage during
the years of bargain
116
than during years prior to the bargaining process. The
findings of this study did not support this statement.
The data appear to indicate that teachers who
bargain collectively do not cause their salaries to in-
crease to a higher percent during the years of bargaining
than in the non-bargaining years.
Of the twenty-two negotiating districts in Delaware
only three or 13.6 percent had a higher percentage change
in the negotiating years. Nineteen or 86.4 percent of
the districts had higher annual percentage gains in non-
negotiating years.
Sixteen or 72.7 percent of the negotiating dis-
tricts reported the highest single annual percentage gain
in a non-negotiating year. However, fourteen districts
(63.6 percent) reported the lowest annual percentage in-
crease in a negotiating year. One district reported an
equally low gain in both a negotiating and non-negotia-
ing year.
Even though 63.6 percent of the districts reported
their lowest annual increase in a negotiating
year, one
must be cautioned against drawing a conclusion
of the
impact resulting from collective negotiations.
Data from the Question
on Teacher Job Actions
in Delaware School Districts.
In the state of Delaware only five
school districts
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experienced a teacher strike during the years 1966 to
1975. Because of the small number of districts able
to respond in this area, it was not possible to gain
sufficient data to develop a generalizable conclusion.
Although little can be concluded, the data appear
not to support the statement that the percentage of
salary increase in a school district will be higher in
a year when teachers conduct a job action than in a
year without a job action. Two of the five districts
experiencing a job action report that salary was not an
issue in the strike. In these instances the effects of
the job action can not be related to the salary increase.
Of the three remaining districts experiencing a
job action, one reported a salary increase after the job
action. The other two districts recorded low or no
gains in salary including one district whose teachers re-
turned to work after the strike without a salary raise.
Data from 1: ne Question
Dealing with Salary,
Schedule Structure
The data tend to indicate that collective
negoti-
ations have not generally changed the structure
of the
salary schedule, although changes have
been made on some
schedules. Of the possible six hundred
eighty-four
changes that could have taken place
over the entire
period of the study only forty-eight (7
percent) changes
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were made. Of the forty-eight changes, thirty were made
on schedules prepared in negotiating years.
The additions and deletions do represent changes on
the schedules, but the form and the structure of the salary
schedules were not modified or altered. The single salary
schedule has remained intact; collective negotiations did
not change the schedule structure.
OPINION QUESTIONS
Data from the Opinion Questions
on Salary Escalation
The consensus from the participants was that teacher
salaries have responded in some degree to collective nego-
tiations. The range of the responses varied from eleven
(42.3 percent) responding to "strong and very strong, to
thirteen or 49.9 percent of the participants answering
"mild or very mild." One respondent indicated that
col-
lective negotiations have had no effect on teacher
sal-
aries I The "no effect" answer was not consistent
with
the other responses.
Data from the Opinion Question on
Factors Heaving a Grea ter Imojict^cm
Salaries than Collective Nc-rgptj^ions
The respondents listed factors that
in their opinion
had a greater impact on teacher
salaries than collective
negotiations. The information has been
recorded but no
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conclusions were drawn because of incomplete supporting
documentation. The following items were suggested:
1. Cost of living index
2. Voter opposition to taxes
3 . State and local financing laws
4. New board members
5
. ,
Teacher shortages
6. New outlook on teacher salaries
7 . New superintendent
Thirteen or 48.2 of the participants reported no
factor having a greater impact on teacher salaries.
The E ffects of Teacher Salaries
in the State of Dol~a.'.are
The data tend to indicate that when the legislated
state of Delaware salary schedule increased, the district
salary increases were similar. In years when no
increase
was legislated by the state, the districts salary
schedules
reflected low increases. In some districts no
legislated
increase in salary from the state resulted in
no salary
increase in those districts
.
in the two years when the state of
Delaware did not
legislate any increase in teacher salary,
all twenty-six
school districts reported their lowest
percentage in salary
increases
.
Conclusions
The primary question posed
concerning the effects of
collective negotiations on the
salaries of public school
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teachers was investigated and the findings have been sum-
marized in the previous section. It is appropriate at
this point to discuss several additional conditions before
/
|
presenting the conclusions.
A factor in this study that could not be measured
is the effect of the current excess of qualified teachers
and how that excess impacted on teacher salaries. Also
unproductive in this study were attempts to connect the
location of the school district (urban-suburban) , tenure
of the superintendent, budget referenda, attitudes of
board members toward teacher compensation and the ability
of a district to pay salaries, as factors that may have
affected the salaries of teachers. A complete rundown of
the information available in the above areas failed to
support any conclusions of an impact on teacher salaries.
Further research is needed in these areas.
The conclusions of this study, developed from an
analysis of the research and related literature are as
follows
:
1. Collective negotiations have not produced higher
percentage gains in teacher salaries for most
public school districts in Delaware.
2. Collective negotiations did not produce
the
highest annual increase in salary in most
public
school districts in Delaware.
Collective negotiations will not always
produce
3.
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a salary increase.
4. Job actions or strikes do not always produce
a salary increase.
5. Collective negotiations have not altered the
structure of the teacher's salary schedules in
Delaware.
6- The legislatured state salary schedule has much
influence on the salary schedules in the public
school districts of Delaware.
An analysis and summary of the opinion questions in-
dicate the respondents to perceive:
1. That the salaries of the teachers in Delaware
would have escalated at the same rate without
collective negotiations.
2. That collective negotiations have had some
effect on teacher salaries.
3. That there are factors in addition to collect-
ive negotiations that have affected teacher
salaries in Delaware.
Implications
On the basis of information presented in
this
study, collective negotiations did not
cause percentage
increases in salary greater than the gains
in the years
without the negotiating process. In fact
in many in-
stances, the percentages of salary
increases were higher
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in negotiating years than in non-negotiating years.
The conclusions should not be interpreted to
mean that collective negotiations have had no impact on
teacher salaries. A majority of the respondents in-
dicated that in their opinion collective negotiations
did affect teachers' salaries.
It may well be that factors such as the depressed
job market and other economic conditions were acting
against increased salaries and collective negotiations
served to maintain the salary levels. An implication
gained from the literature is that collective negotia-
tions helped to produce minimum gains in salary at a
time when the excess of teachers in the job market
should have leveled or even decreased the salaries.
With the number of strikes and other job actions
resulting from collective negotiations, a heavy price
in terms of lost time and ill feelings is being imposed
on school districts. At the same time the results in
teacher salary increases do not vary much from school
districts not involved in the negotiations process.
For this reason the future may well cause elected
officials to react to public pressure and develop
legis-
lation to control negotiation activities of
teacners.
This could and possibly will change the scope
of bargain-
ing in public education.
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It has been determined that in many states a large
portion of the teachers' salaries are appropriated from
the state level. The laws that govern schools and most
of the regulations permitting collective negotiations are
all enacted at the state level.
It may well be that legislation supporting state-
wide teacher negotiations such as in Hawaii, is needed
in the near future. On the other hand, it has been sug-
gested that public pressure may cause the collective
negotiating process to go down belov; the district level
to the level of each individual school. At this level,
parents and community groups would negotiate directly
with staff on the basis of the productivity in than school.
It is difficult to generalize about the effects of
collective negotiations? but, it can be implied that the
process has created a change in public education and to a
limited degree in teachers' salaries. However, at the
present; much time, effort and money are being expended
on
a process that appears to have had limited effect.
Recommendat ions
The preceding section listed the conclusions
reach-
ed in this study based on an analysis of
the investigation,
the related literature and the responses
from the quest-
ionnaires. This the final section of the
study presents
recommendations and certain suggestions for
future research
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The recommendations generally are based upon the
findings and conclusions of this study. However, experi-
ences gained as a result of my six years of work in the
field of collective negotiations are reflected also in
the area of suggested research.
Recommendation 1 It is recommended that legis-
lation be enacted that would prohibit negotiations on any
portion of teachers' salaries not appropriated by the nego-
tiating agency.
From this study it was determined that the state
legislature in Delaware controls the majority of the
teachers' salaries. This governing body appropriates annual-
ly, with few exceptions, amounts of money to be paid as sal-
ary. However, in the years when no appropriations are given,
some districts (Wilmington, Delaware as an example) have
negotiated salary schedules requiring payment of increased
salaries and must pay this increase without the benefit of
the state supplement. The recommended legislation
would pre-
vent this situation. It would protect districts and
tax-
payers from paying the anticipated state amount in
years when
the state fails to appropriate money to local
districts.
Also, the legislation would limit negotiations
only to rev
enues under the direct control of the local
school district.
Pennmmcndation 2 It is recommended that
legislation
educational negotiations that would requirebe enacted for
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a "cooling off" period and a defined impasse procedure
similar to legislation affecting labor problems consider-
ed to be in the national interest or the defense of the
/
country
.
This study has shown that job actions and strikes
do not always produce increased salaries or benefits.
However, much time and energy are lost as a result of
short work stoppages. They might have been prevented if
both sides had been required to return to discuss the
problem before a drastic action was taken.
Many times work stoppages place a greater hardship
on the third party, the student, than on the participants
in the negotiating process. Legislation requiring a f : nal
discussion period before an action may prevert the entire
action from occurring, thereby, eliminating all of the
wasted time, effort and hardship.
Recommendation 3 It is recommended that this study
be replicated, using only local district
supplements as
the dependent variable to determine if the
effects of
collective negotiations are consistent with
the findings
of this study.
This study was conducted using the
total salary as
the reference. It was found that
a large portion of the
salary in each district is the result
of a state appropri-
ation and is not affected totally
by local negotiations.
A study designed around only the
local portion of salary
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schedules might show the exact effects of the individual
organization in each district and its impact on teacher
salaries
.
Recommendation 4 It is recommended that this study
be replicated using school districts from many states.
This would cast light on whether or not the effects of
collective negotiations on teachers 1 salaries elsewhere
are consistent with the findings from Delaware.
This replication could take on many variations.
Variations of the study could examine only fiscally depend-
ent or fiscally independent school districts. There could
also be a study of all urban or all suburban school dis-
tricts. Another study could include all NEA school dis-
tricts. A fourth study could be limited to large or small
districts. Additional studies could be conducted using
any combination of the above mentioned districts.
Recommendation 5 It is recommended that a study be
designed to determine if effects of the following
factors
have had a greater impact on teacher salaries
than col-
lective negotiations:
a. budget referenda
b. superintendent' tenure in the
district
c . elected or appointed hoard members
d. local support for teacher
compensation
The factors listed above may all
play an important role
Ln determining district expenditures.
It is possible that
my one or a combination of items
could control the sal-
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aries paid to teachers. These factors were mentioned
in this study. Conclusions were not reached because
of a lack of information. However there are implications
for future study.
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QUESTIONNAIRE - COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AND TEACHERS' SALARIES
Part I
General Information
A. Name of district
B. Student population (September 30, 197M
C. Total employees presently classified in teacher unit
D. 1. Has the Board of Education formally recognized an exclusive
negotiating representative for the teaching staff? (Yes-no)
2. a. If yes, what school year was formal recognition granted to
the teaching employees? 19 - 19 •
b. What is the state affiliation of the organization representing
the teaching staff? (Please check one)
a. Delaware Federation of Teachers
b. Delaware State Education Association
c . Independent (give name)
d . Other (give name )
Part II
This section is to determine the degree of teacher collective negotiation
activity in your district.
Definition: For the purpose of this study collective negotiation is
defined as:
A procedure where representatives of the teachers' unit
and representatives of the Board of Education engage in
meaningful "give-and-take" discussions and define the
working conditions, rights of employees, and methods for
dispute settlement.
A. 1. Would your district be considered a "negotiating district" as
defined above? (Yes-no)
2. If yes, when was the first salary schedule established as a
result of negotiations? 19 “ '9 •
B.
C .
3 How many people are on the negotiating teams?
a. Teacher team b. Board team
If no, what method does your
ditions, rights of teachers
action, Board and teacher di
acceptance) •,
district use to establish working
and dispute settlement (Unilateral
scussions, Teacher recommendationsi
con -
Board
Boa r d
Does your district have a written agreement with
the teachers
organization? (Yes- no)
2 .
3 -
l*.
5 .
Who signed the agreement?
a. Board representative c *
b. Teacher representative d *
Does the agreement contain a grievance
Unsigned
procedure? (Yes-no)
s the salary schedule a part of the
agreement? (Yes-no)
what year was the sa I ary
schcdu I
e
written agreement? 19
—
_
'9—
•
first included in the
This chart has been designed to
schodule was constructed In
fart II I
determine the
you r district.
conditions under which each salary
1. Each column represents a different salary schedule.
2. Each column requires an answer unless otherwise stated
3. Please place the letter "U" In any block where the Information
Is not aval table or the answer Is unknown
•
SALARY SCHEDULES
jj- 9T5 1
966 1
966 1
967 1
967 1
968 1
968 1
969 1
969 1
970 1
5* 70 1
9 7 1 1
7 1 1
=17? 1
372 1
9 7 1 I
#73 1
7k
1. List the letter " N 1 ' in each year in which your dis-
trict was a negotiating district. Use the letter
"0" for each non-neqotiating year.
>11. 1 L
2. For each year listed, select the letter from the
list below that best describes the "Board-teacher
Involvement In the development of the salary
schedule
.
a. Collective negotiations as defined in this
questionnaire.
b. Unilateral decision by Board of Education.
c. Board- teacher discussions; unilateral decision
by Board.
d. Board- teacher discussions; agreement by both
sides.
e. Teacher recommendations; Board acceptance.
f . Other (describe)
(Letters may be repeated)
•
3. List the month of completion for any year in which
the salary schedule was not completed before Sep-
tember 1st. In each year when the salary was not
retroactive state, "NO".
4. If any schedule resulted from a job action by the
teachers, list the number that best describes that
action.
1. Strike with picketing
2. Strike without picketing
3 . PI eke ting
4 . SI ck-ou t
5. Personal day absence
6 . "Get out the vote" campaign
7. Other (descr i be)
For each year in which job action occurred
a. Number of work days involved.
b. Percentage of teachers participating.
c. Percentage of salary increase gained above
Increase offered before iob action.
5. Check the year(s) in which the salary schedule was
completed with the aid of a third party such as a
mediator.
6 . Check any year (s) in which a budget defeat prevented
a teacher salary raise.
7. Check any year(s) in which new educational levels
were added to the salary schedule.
8 . Check any year(s) in which new educational levels
were dropped from the salary schedule.
9. Check any year(s) in which new steps were added to
the salary schedule.
10. Check any year(s) in which steps were dropped
from the salary schedule.
II. Check the year(s) in which longevity steps were
added to the salary schedule.
12. Check the year(s) in which longevity steps were
drooped from the salary schedule.
— Part IV
| n any year did the teachers accept another benefit In lieu of additional
salary? Please describe
and list the year(s). . —
2. Old any event or
list the year ( s
)
condition not previously mentioned affect any sa lary schedule? Please describe
and
—
3 . Please list any
nego tlatlons on
a d d i t i on a 1
teacher 1 s
information that would assist in this study to determine the effects
of
—
Opinion Questions:
I. In your opinion, what effects have collective negotiations had on teachers' salaries?
Very strong Strong
_
Mild V cry mild
______
None
2 . What would be your reaction to the following statement:
would have escalated at a similar rate without collective
Strong support Mi Idly support Mildly oppose
The salaries of the teachers In my district
negotiations.
Strongly oppose No opinion
3 . In your opinion, what factor In your district has had a
greater Impact on teachers
collective negotiations? (fxamples: New Superintendent, Board members elected on
platform". Cost of living Index, etc.) (If none, so state) —
s a I a r I e s
No salary
than
raise
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WIL.MINC1TON 1‘UIILLC SCHOOLS
I*. O. liOX HOII
Wilmington, Dulawakr 10800
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UK. ICAKIi O. JACKSON, SK., HUI’ICUINTKNDUNT
/
JOHHIi’lI 15. JOHNSON, Dihkctou
PEH.SONNM1, and Kmi*luybk Kelations
January 22, 1975
Dear :
I am in the data collection phase of my dissertation and would
appreciate your assistance in completing the enclosed question-
naire. My study is an analysis of the effect of collective neg-
otiations on the salaries of the teachers of Delaware. The period
of the study covers the ten years beginning in 1 965 and ending in
1975*
Information from the salary schedules of each of our 26 school
districts has been recorded. The information from your district
is attached to your questionnaire. The percentages of salary
increase will be computed in each category listed for each of the
ten years. The questionnaire will be used to determine if any
special conditions existed to produce the changes or lack of
change on each salary schedule.
Your assistance in this study will help me to provide additional
data for school personnel to use in future decision making sit-
uations regarding the effects of collective negotiations on teach-
er's salaries. When the study has been completed, you will re-
ceive a summary of the findings. If it is the will of the body,
the findings can be presented at one of our future personnel
directors' meetings.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Your truly,
Joseph E. Johnson
D i rector
JE J : e
j
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§ 4001. Definition of terms.
As used in this chapter:
(1) “Kmpl'iyi-v iM Pt f u" mrr.ns ihoso item* eonlrilmli,* to the eralojee s well;, re l.y tlx, Iw-al sehool d„lrir, a „,| IU1, M1 , fl ,, incomt
To " rtr* T' r,M a,i,i
w
«
-iiiouiur.fits oImo unhid*.* h due: chech-off" system.
«.lov!,.?n7tT n
0,r ' l
?
i:M
,
, ' ,
r‘
orK;in > /:‘lioii of certified ei„.
p oyees of. ptiMte * d,strut whirl, has as one of its purposes the
r<| risenUtiO" of such employees in the:r relations with the board of educa-lion of the district.
( t) "Salaries" means the direct compensation of the employee for his (her)professional services.
(4) School district means any school district or reorganized school dir.-
tncl of the State.
(a) "Public s-hool employee" means any certificated nonadmir.istrativo
employee employed by a school district. Supervisory or si.aff personnel shall
n0
m.'
!?‘ U
.
d *'d W“ ,1L' ,,K!4n, ">-' of the term "public school employee.”
(G) \\ orkinj; conditions" means physical condition of facilities in the
school district build, m-s sue), as. but not limited to beat. 1*1.1,I*, sanitation
and food processing. (M Del. C. 1973. 5 4001; 77 Del. hues, c. 208.)
§ 4002. Purpose.
The purpose of this chapter is to promote the improvement of personnel
management and employer-employee relationships within the public v-huol sys-
tem by recognizing the right nf the public employees to join orgaaitv.ions'of
their own choice and to he represent'd by such organizations :n thc : r
profcssioi.al and employ mem relationships with hoards of education. To this end,
a free and open exchange of views betwi en the hoard of education of the school
district and puhLc sehool ••niployecs is deemed ilesirtible and in the public inter-
cst. (M Del. C. l'l-V*. a 400'; .77 Del. Laws, c. 208.)
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DELAWARE CODE
ANNOTATED
REVISItf) 1974
14 5 4003 EDUCATION 14 § 4004 14 $ 4005 ri;On>. IOMA1, NEGOTIATIONS. ETC. 14 § 4006
§ 4CC3. Public school employees organizations: dues.
(n> Public school employees have the right to join any organization for their
proio.vonal or econonvc improvement, but membership in any specific organiza-
tion shad not be required as a condition of employment.
(b' Organizations that rock to represent a certificated school district em-
ployee i:» professional negotiations shall so specify on membership applications.
(c) Dues >l«:»!i he deducted by the employer for organizations representing
employee* only with In*’ request and assent of the employee in writing. (14 Del.
C. 1M.53, 400.», 37 Del. Daws, c. 2Jb.)
§ 4u0 f . Certification of exclusive negotiating representative.
(a) A\y employee organization may pi t it i*>i i the hoard of education for cert if i-
en f i«'n as the exclusive negotiating representative nf the public school employees
of a sci on! dMiici. Any such pe'iiinn shall he dated and shall have annexed to
it a u-t * f ;* •• current im ntbers of the employ* •• organ. at:.»n. vrtified as eorrect
by a. o?;.i*»*r • the employe org.i tii a»n autlioc!. ed la make such certification,
Ai:d delivered to tb« s» eret.iry n f the hoagi! of educali'.n. Copies of the petition
lh'**. i 'it <*f lev j «*• of r’vmbej ) * bad be i# *: ** d cm the do'»r of every >clu’o!hi"jsc
i:i t f • • «!. 'ri*f ;:d •• 1 el;..r | to’» j/ i t p’;u-o each scl’onlhouse in 'he
d *r- c* 'I * i - a! p. • it • »•. m hiding h t nf men hers. shall be plnl with 'he
.•cc.xD.rv i : •.! i ts-ani «»f i di:cati«»!; for p« i a,..»m,t r- void I'.mplou e organ a-
t»"u- ') a!! Mjhru.l grovglh I >r ii-pn ‘ i«.n i
. .
the '•••aid of edit* ..lion alio} their
ineJ.ib'T' h'pappla a’ >. > in older t! it '.he 1 • • . r « I ma\ h. d* liuilivly a- s ired that
.1 n> :i\
.*f 1 1 m e In r > i of il-.e eiuplov « organi/.it>on l aw ind:c.ited tlnir
«'• re '.•> be r* . • ted I , il.e or»' " i. ilaiu n collective bargaining uegotia-
ti M»N. a- pi e »ei ib» d by Mibseetn ,n fl*) of *1 |IMKt of tin., title.
tbt 1?. tie* ev< lit the |<o ud of ediie.it i«m deti riiunes that a majority of its public
m'Iiim 1
,
i o.plov ees ate !; ted a* members «‘f th'' org.uu/a! ion, and the in.'.jority
of ^ nb loen I « r b.iie »• i* ' i 'ted a desire to lie repie ei.ted by the employee
* i
,'
*it ’l Ml Ul I vi 1 I a roll,' Oe/o- .»-nir.
.» pie .cribed h\ ‘ ih i ell'Ui
(bl of • li'o.l of l!. •*•••• 'he 1 o.ml of In* 1 1 1m v , ..i!| i eitif) in writing ml !• ,s
that. ” 1 * • * • ai d i *1 l.*t« : 'han l*ul »\ • ft* i the fi!ir.g am* po» tmg of tla | etitmii
lb. i* tbt or;.no/ iti 'ii ih«* i Jkidn^ive lagotiitimt h pre* entative of the ptdd.c
•
.
'
. I « :i.|i|o)nv of the sehool ill triet, nuler > \\ it Inn the hOd.iv pel i< d .i petit,on
(• (| . . / tile holding of ail • ledmu i * filed . pi on ided III Mib:.n lion (e» of (his
Mil II
l I If within ! ;0 d.ivs afi> i the filing, and po ling of the petition at h a I HO.*
of Ih* total nimbi r id tl • public m ImhiI enployi • . of the >ch"o| di *
1
1
1
*1 file *v it
h
the • nri Ur) t*f Ihe boaid of (illnation a petition requeuing that an idoelnm
be held to determine tbc exclusive negotiating representative, the election ^hall
lie held m ’. less than 30 days of receipt of the* jietition by the secretary of the
board of education, between the dates of September 1 and June 15.
(d) The local board of education may order an election to determine the exclu-
sive negotiating mprescntati
. e.
(e) In the event that the board of education determines tn good faith that an
organization does not have the requisite membership for o rnfication, or that
an organization does not have the right to an election urn!- : subsection (c) of
this section, the organization shall have the right to appeal within 30 days to
the State Hoard of Education. (14 Del. C. 1053, § 4004; 57 Del. Laws, r ‘203.)
§ 4003. Conducl of election.
fa) Whenever an i lidimi to determine the exclusive negotiating rep-
resentative shall be held, it shall he the responsibility of the hoard of cdima'icn
to conduct the election, to set the time, Focation (locations) of the jyjls am] to
act as officers or to
:
poemt officers, except that no officer appointed shall he
a member of any organization that appears on the ballot.
(b) The ballot at the (diction shall contain the name of the employee organi'.a-
lion which filed the petition under subsection (a) of 5 4»iiil of this title and the
name of any other employee organization which, not !w> than 20 days before
sa»d election, f:Vs with the secretary of the board of ednalio:: written cvrt.f.» d
evidence of membership inridlment of at hast !’#f> - of t! total members of
public school employ ' n of the Mdiool district. The ballot si... II also contain an
appropriate spare for the public school employee to indicate "No negotiating unit
desired."
(c) When ail election is held li e exclusive negotiating representative shall not
he certified which dor * not receive an afl’vm.itive vote by a najor.tv of the total
number of public sehoul employees eligible to vote in tin election.
(d) An employ e org.itu ation deni* d crrtifieatio.i in an eln tion as the exclu-
sive in got i:«dug ri pre i nt.it ivv of the puhiie sehool i inployi »of a m bool ilistr;* l
under the provi-ioits of tin mi’Iiiiii shall he ii.eligild*' to p»-tilion the sch,»ol
ile tncl under tool of the. title f«.r a period of 1 year from M.e date of such
denial ll I Del. t* l!t »:i, ^ lull ., .*7 Del Laws, r 2 'S i
II lUOG. lAclusive n« a goti:iting tepicsentiitivc; professional rela-
tions; period ol n i til ication.
f .• ) An ||||MI1 I ' ition rei lifirtl u*- the rVrlii* ive iiegolial ng n pr*-^« r,tutive shall
hive the right to he the exilusm negoh.a n.g t> •|»r**». i.l,»'ive of public M'hool
M 4 400? EDUCATION H 'i 4008
H 4 4iHr.t
X JD
fp.j.:,.,..., of tl„- school
.Strict iii all matters relating l0 inilaries, employee
lU'iM ists iiiul wor*i|ig nnnir.i<»»»H.
(M Nothing in tin's r'upt.-r sliall lie <•(iistni. il as to proliil.it the hoard uf
education ami lln- exeHi negotiating representative f,„m n,t.t«:«lly agreeing
ujH.-i oil, or matters for d- n-nmi. except as |.rol.ibit. .1 in subsection (c) of 4 401 i
of ibis iitlo.
(fl The ccrtifica'iot, of an exclusive negotiating representatinn either by elec-
t"»n or otlieru ise skill ! for a iiiiiiinium period of 111 months ft tun the dale of
c*‘i 1. ficat ion. At least . a > calendar days prior to the expiration of the eerli fieal ion,
the exclusive negotiating representative may apply for renewal of its certifica-
tion b\ submittai); a certific ' count of its members, or any other employee
ortMni...itinn may ;|J p.y for eertificatem as the exclusive negotiating rep-
re 1 Illative of the plil.iie sc! I enudoye, s as provide d for in 4 lull I of Hus title
or .I*1 of the total puml.cr of the other m'IiooI employees of the sehool district
niav petition for a new election as provided for in subsection (c) of 4 1001 of this
title. U-l I lei. C. 196:1, 4 Jimti; 67 Pel Laws, c. 298.)
§ 4007. Rights, of imiividtutl employees.
I'llOEKSSIONAl. NKCOTIATIONS. ETC. 14 I 4010
and nepntlatiiins I with the terms of surh contract or agreement shall
not be reo|H'ned during that time. (14 pel C. I'J.Vt, 4 4iKm, 67 pel l.v,,. c jgjx )
§ 4000. Rights guarantcecl.
The board of education or its deslpnn'cd representatives shall not interfere,
restrain or euerce employm hi (lie right to,,,.- mine pimniiiteed by this chaiKcr,
»nd, in nbsenre of any eerlifu alion as the exrluMXt bargaining representative,
all organizations seeking lu represent public SC In nil , .j.loyei s shall be accorded
equal treatment with res|«ct to access to such employees
No representative of any employee organization shall be permitted to solicit
membership therein, or to solicit petitions or votes for the purpose of obtaining
a collective bargaining agreement. on school property at any tune, uni, ss he
sliall be a bona fide employee of the particular school de.lrirt involved and a
member of the local employee organization * horn he purimrls to represent All
election campaigning on school property during school hours shall he restricted
to those areas reserved exclusively for each, r use. (I I Pel. C. I’J.sl, 4 4009, 67
Del. Izxws, e. 298.)
Nothin); in this chapter sh.il! prohibit any cerlifi-.iled employee from nppear-
inR ''.i bis own behalf oil m.. Iters relating ta his employment lain Lions with the
school district. (14 Pel. C. 196:1, 4 41M17; 67 Pel. I.aws, c. 298.)
§ 4008. Obligations of both parties; arbitration.
Tl<f r\clu'i«r pntilrirs pramlt-d tu u union
buM-tl up«*n this m-iliun nir c«iH«iiluli*inull)
pt rmi«>ihlr 44 In r ll r «li iii.il «.f siuiiUr rights In
t .nt In i uiiiiiti Mfvt- |iri)ti»"l«‘ ;i i iiii.jh
Rial* Iiitcrvst, Oi.il i» Oh* ilfMrc It* lit |> lnn.1
btnl lm/.s .uni ^ruui.<U from In * uirnni; l.ii-ir lul
llt-fulil.-. K(‘*l*-i.i’.i*in «*f l»»‘l T* arbiTN v hi Li
Warr ltd uf K*lui. t 3.15 K Su|.j» i'Xi (I) 1M.
IV 1 11.
W lu rt lh» »t l»*n*l l«rur*l rt • *.yi it. <1 n l» *r I.erV
Ivsm l ilmfl t» 0 4' riflbMi* Inyi.'itl *i|' !*y
r* mi' ilitr. III*- ji.I uf rtrluMw |if.i i% i'. •. in
rludiiii,' Hit- r<p Iii lo u*i- »rlii>.| («• i!,|n «. <*}4
t'litslitulcMMlIy |« rnii »il,l4 K(~l' r<it<oii of |M.
Wlii h v hr I V.*rr Hd of Kduc
.
J35 1
Sujip 3V»U) Ini 1071)
Tin* borircl of ciiuciilion or ;ts representative and the exclusive no^otialinp
reprv>enl ilive of the public school employees, through their designated officials
or representatives, ar.d upon the request of either party, shall have the ilutv to
iiv£«'tiatc in pood faith \\;th resp.-ct to' salaries, employee benefits and working
conditions.
(td The board of education or its representative and the exclusive negotiating
representative of the public school employees shall meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to the matters covered by subsection (a) of §
of this title.
Id No contract or agreement executed between the 2 parties shall specify
directly or indirectly binding arbitration or decision making by a third party or
‘parties The rights of tlw public through their legally ele» led or appointed b* ard
of education in final |«di»*y mak itg arc n«»l snbj**et to negotiation
id I Any Contract or a**r» «nteti'. re'clod •••J*.vee;i lit.* 'J parii**, *h;dl b* (•'* *«
me. nu- i *'?» of .* »f' u *1 c efti ''.r .• d %••• of -on h •unii i t "f agr* •
14 § 4011
§ 4010. Submission lo an impartial committee.
Whenever it appears to the hoard of education or the exclusive negotiating
representative that a persistent disagreement exists with respect to salaries,
employee benefits and working conditions as defined in subsection (h) of $ 4006
of this title concerning which the parlies have been negotiating, either the hoard
of education or the exclusive negotiating r* pn-sentatiw m.»y request mediation
hy any method mutually agreed upon. In tin .th .enee of sin h an agreement, and
within 10 days, the hoard ol education a. id the rxrhjsjw negotiating r«-|>-
resrntative should select a mediator hy n.*i!nal agreement In tie- al#>er,ri* i#f
such agreement, and wiihin aiiotln*r I *• da . . a mediation I'oniiiiittee, v. hu h .-hall
consist of it persons, | selected hy lie* ex»bisi\e ||‘ gntiall'ig repr** 1a stative, 1
rti’liM t*'«| l.v the hoard 4 if « lliiCi!* I* tii. iii.il .i lluril )i»T*>t*u h i I. 'I l.v t .t .1 1 ii I ;itnr.
It' lit t f b'ltli I'.ti ltCN, sh.iil Itf fttri.it (I 'I III I'.tr-I |» Hit 1 .1
1
'tlit tl ltl.it .- will
i
1
•• ax i*. i -it,., i uf !.• t-tii riifttn.illi'..
14 § 4913EDUCATION
In the event that fact finding is requested by either party, a fact-finding
committee will be selected by the method described above for mediation.
Within 21 calendar days of its existence, the mediation committee will issue
a report setting fnrlli the circumstances of the impasse and thi ir recommenda-
tions for settling the dispute.
Any costs involved in resolving such an impasse shall be divided equally
between the parties. (14 Del. C. 19.6:1, 4 4010; .67 Pel. Paws. c. 298.)
§ 4011. Observance of teaching contract; violation; strike.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any public school employee to engage in any tactic
which circumvents any provision of bis teaching contract
(b) If an employee organization designated as exclusive representative shall
violate the provisions hereof, its designation as exclusive representative shall
he revoked hy tie- public school employer and said employee organization and
any other employee organization which violates any of the provisions hereof
shall lie incligthh to he di s.gi'.it. d as exclusive representative for a period of
2 years Ihercaf tei'lf any employ organization violates the provisions hereof,
the |. .lithe sehool employer -shall i.-fr-vii li.-in making payroll deductions for that
organization’s dues for a period of 1 year thereafter.
(c) No mihlic school employee shall strike while in the performance of his
official duties. Knr pe.rpo- e> ol tl-s •• n.ei. the word "strde" shall he deemed
an une.xeused absence p-l Pel. I 19,1.1, 4 -loll, a7 Pel I.aws, c. ^.18.)
§ 4012. Kxisling agreements.
Nothing herein xh id he d.-enie.l as a termination or invalidation of existing
p.grct-incitts I ftvi I en a board ef education and all erguie alien of public school
employees, i vo pi I 1 ,, e'l.-nl that they are in ninth' t with provisions of
this
< hapl. r. (I I Pci < |9.,.;. 4 1012, 67 Pel I.aws, c. 293.)
I» tOI2. Ollier statutes.
This eliapler i iiil. od. -I t" be in ail.lilion and Mipl'I. mentary
to other laws uf
tins Stale and hall not I lived lo repeal any of I he
ether prove ions of
tins title If lie i. 1
1
a emit la I between any agieeim nt arising under this
chapter
nml a plot , a nil,lor any ..flier chapter of th, title,
the provtsau, a.M.ig
under any nth. r chapter of .he Utle shall prex.nl. U 1 Pel. C. 19.6:1, 4 401.1.
6.
Pel. I.iws, c. 29H.)
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REVISED 1974
§ 1301. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) 'Tulilie employer" mentis:
a. The State of I)ela re or any aj;ency thereof;
b. Any county of th. ate, or any agency thereof;
c. Any mui.icipal corporation, nmnicipality, city or town located with-
in the State, or any agency thereof which, upon the affirmative b-gisla-
tivc act of ius common council or other governing body elects to come
within this chapter.
(2) “I’ublic employe. " means any employee of a public employer except:
a. Any person elected by popular vote or appointed to office by the
Governor;
b. Any certified professional employee of the public school system
of the State;
c. Any person who is a prisoner or inmate, or is otherwise held in
lawful custody hy an agency of the State.
(d) Employment relations means matters concerning wages, salaries,
hours, vacations, sick leave, grievance procedures and other terms and
cori'fiti'ins of employment.
(4) H;i rnainiriu iT|»rc> dilative*" means any lawful organization which
has as a primary purpose the representation of public employee:; in their
employment rclai« *i .s with the public employer.* *
(o) “Collective t»a.*g..u»ingM means the performance of the mutual obliga-
tion* of the publ.c cii
; .
yr.r anfl the exclusive bai gaining representative ic
meet at reasonable * i..i*s, U; eonfi-r u:vl negot.ale in g*»(>d faith and t«»
execute a written agreement with r. sj>ect to employment relations, except
that by uu"h obligation neither parly shall be compelled U> agree to a pro-
13 * |»02 lUCIlT OK VL’I’l.lC KMPLOYKF.S TO ORGANIZE 10 §1301 LAIlOk 1 (J $ i:»07 *
jKi-'iil or lx- required to mahe a cosires* >•» i, unless othvrwi<**
;
videJ in * v..s
chapter.
(C) "Department" means the l' itment of 1. 1 <»r. (19 Del. C. 19b3, §
1301; r»5 Del. Laws, o. 120; £>7 Del. .. ws. c. 609, . A. I t A; W Dei. Laws,
c. 150. § 1.)
The nrhrrnr of ihi* rlm{ trr in rf>r«*rl«-d |>n»er.uiiN f«-r Imtlt the n.>'inln rs
timaid l!ir nr'iiliun i»f an a, ren.irnf whivh of liu-ir f.u.i In- - is *»th •. '.I f ' •* »••• »;*
kclilfN for a tfrfiiiil*' linn 1nl-»»r r« l.iln»n» !*••• of cv'.ltvliw* . 1 : 111 : 1c as tu-(.n>‘<l .i» ’.M IM c
(wren llir |mriiov Suit* v Amor, an K»d‘n of * l’*‘U (. 1 ) »ml Stato \ Art**riv\*i» toiln of
Slitf, (V-on*y A MiuiH'ip:i > i ju|*l«*)vts. IahM S’llr. t’oun'.y A Mu mop..! FnT,'l«'>fC<. I :il
1726. KM A 2«1 a«Vj (tlel fh 17.T.. «\*x A j.i itiVJ tlU-l. iTi I.K Ji
Therefore. a riilln-litr lmiK.iininK nrrro- This flmpU-r is innp:«lir»hli> In the operation
mrnl is m himtiiiK roiilr;i'l for the net »l Hit* lh .11 r Mmimid! H >'*!».«• un.l-.-r ll r
forth therein. Suite v Aitu r.t.«»» I • a n of Stile, Urm « f 11 ! . C > lie! I' I.i* .ire K.v
County Mui>i|giI Kniplovoes, I ^al 17lMi. er A l«.iy Aut'. \ (*.»rvl.v', IM lV’ t'li. *2 1 3. 1!'J2
A 2d :iC>2 (Pel Ch l'J72) A 2d l!*4 iC’h l‘.‘o b.
Kteept inM.far as it is in ennflii t «»iih pro**- Thus the Chniwerv C« urt has jurisdiction
inns of law of ronslitiilion. • • Nr Mute v osci (.iiinilui - nppi.i i»»r* l<»r uijjiiflnr rc*
American Krd’n «*f Mat* . (‘minty & Municipal lirf a.Nun-' * 1 * r. I »M - r» i. *n’e on t .u< cJiapler
Fmployeofc. L<al 172'* 2t»n A 2d 302 (Del. Ch. which i> r - « .Me to t:..- I n Jpe o^>r«iion.
Yj~2) Ih l iware K.\* r »v Pay Ant ; i Cars-ilo, 43 Pel
Ch. 213. A Jo 7U4 (Ch
Ilmlth Insurance nithin rrope of collective
barxniniiiif. - The Mil>j>rl of l.ialth insurance
8 1302. Kig!U to organize.
This section remains inrffrrilee
. i| ( r nttun- i* Uker h^ 'hoSUtUrcf Nr* J»fey flep
lights of lKla«arr Memorial llr.H^r em- v...r.- Riv-r ii Ray Aulh. v Carvlk), t : D*-|. Ch.
plo>ees a l.o are tor.(.!•//«
-I l, 4 hi Ap'-nry, 21J. 2/2 A 2d 7'»4 1O1 ll/fai).
uii'il concurH-nt leyp«;,,ti/f a ii«.n of a sm.ilar
§ 1305. Election to determine representation.
(a) Where there is no exclusive hargai: iig representative certified for a bar-
gaining unit, the Department shall, upon the request of a bargaining rep-
resentative shoving written proof of at least 30% representation of the public
employees within the unit, hold an election by secret ballot to determine rep-
resentation The ballot shall contain the name of any bargaining repr* sei.lalivc
thn-.vmg w ritten proof of at least 10% representation of the public employees
within the unit and, in every instance, a provision for a marking of no rep-
resentation.
(b) Where there is an exclusive bargaining representative certified for a bar-
gaining unit, llic Department shall, upon the w ritten petition of at least 30% of
the public employees within the unit, I,old an election by secret ballot to deter-
mine representation, except that no election shall he held within 1 year of the
certification of an exclusive bargaining representative. *1 he ballot shall contain
the name of any bargaining representative showing written proof ef at least 10%
representation of tin- public employees within the unit and, in every instance,
a provision for a marking of no repre srntal.on. (10 Del C. 1533, $ 1305; 55 Del.
Laws. c. 12f>
)
The right of public employees freely loorganire and designate representatives
of their own elam: mg for the purpo-e of emleettve bargaining with pahhc em-
plnyers shall not he denied {10 Del. ( . 15. <3, k 1302; ao Dei. laws, c. i-n)
§ 1303. Free exorcise.
No politic employer nr other person dhvelly >r indirectly shall inter!
restrain, coerce or de < rin in ate ag.onst any p ihhe employee in the lrei
of any right under tins chapter (it) Dei (' ( i.MU; n5 Del. Law
ere with.
e\> re:se
c 123.)
8 1301. nargiiiniiig unit.
§ 130f>. Certification of exclusive bargaining representative.
Tie- bargaining representative receiving the majority of all voles cast by the
public employ i es within a bargaining unit upon :n v election held under this
chapter shall la- o rlifu d hy the Department as the . .elusive bargaining rep-
resentative of all the public employe. S Within the tin.!, except that any public
employee at any time may present Ins grew. me.- to the public employer and have
such grievance ad,u od without the intervention of the exclusive bargaining
ropri sentilive. providi .1 that the adjustment is not incun-.istenl with the terns
of 1, collective 1 .0 r gaming ago ,- then in . ffert a-.d the exclusive bargaining
rcpre-entnlnc Inis he. n giv.-n reasonable opporlun.ly to be present. (15 Del. C.
155(1. t, 1 lit HI, 55 I lei laws, c. 120.)
The Depart ne nt, after healing upon rea-.oii.iMe imt.ee, shall decide ill each
case the unit appropriate for tne purpo-e of enlhctne I. up. lining In deter-
mining, tun. lily mg or rmidiiiiiiig tin In. or.m u g '.nut toe lb p.u tmei t shall « on-
aider the dull. .. nsilis nod working C«-|.«!
.
’.
o
-I. . I I the pi. I ne eniphe, • the
he lory of Coll. o live luirgaiiiiiig hy ‘.he puhi e employ i >•
: and tl.eir I -p .iini g
repr I i ent.itive . the extent of urgani/: li-m ni.mi,,- the employees an.
1 lla- de.mv
of the public cmplojcca. (15 Del. (1. r.iill, 7 l i'H. f-.> I'd !-"*». »-'*•>
8 1307. Full ure *»» olituin majority of voles.
In the event that no bargaining
vote, fast hy the public employee*
la-UI under this chapter, no el. item
representative receive* the majority of *11
within a bargaining unit u|nui any election
to determine representation within the unit
I'i * I it : • . In nK i im.it' i Mri.ovr.i;
-> in i ii:i; \si/r, tt, t 1:00
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.hull lie held within 1 Venr thereof H’.t l>.t ( I'.IMI l |:ur; »/, |vl |j (w» c
IW.»
fi 1308. Regulations,
3 ho Department may mate and revi-e or rcx.-ind .orb rcrrlilinnr as it may
doom nm-r.Mii y or apprt.pt i ilo to uilioim- t. r this vl<;t*,i|i*r mat such r.giila.,ons
kliall, oxci-jit a: may t o into i wise provided In it..- Department, ul.o effect upon
pulilii'ation. (HI 1M. f. r.l.;l, l litOH; 55 Del U,ws. c lid.)
§ 1 300. Public employer In l>.-rp:\iu collectively.
The politic employer may engage ; collective bargaining v ith the exclusive
bargaining lepivsciOalivc and la- c employer shall refuse to engage in
collective bargaining with the cxi
1953, § 1305; 55 1 >•!. 1-aws, c. 120.)
Thl* Mfllim rommuml* lluif the public cm-
plot ci niyulinir in f«»-»t! f.iilh. St ile v Ameri-
can fnl'ti of Stall-. I'o.inly ami Muniri|ul
Employ.-.*, l/.tal 1726, kliis A J,| :ir,2 (Del. th.
ltliK)."
And u (food f.iilh ni-|(oli<tlinn implirx tli.it the
employer will |M*r form IIium* min wiiluii il*
pnvAi-r ncit--t>.»ry to hrinj; tilxiul performance of
il.<i unilcrliikiniis. St;il«* v Aim-ric.in It-il'n of
SUito. County A- Municipal Employees, 1/jr.il
1726. 2!*H A.2»l 36;! Uhl. fit l'.»7J»
’
llarpiitninr hound by appropriation of
fund*. — On.- limitation ujion tin- i »*i!i dive bar
Kuiiiiiiy; Matulc, urn! ii|m.ii any .i»* • ••incut
entered into iln-rcm.dt-r. i* lint iho Si;..-* >r any
of »l* a/i*m*icx cannot he lummi to ll.i- •-\p» , nili*
lure of funds which ha\c lint been projvrly
appropriated Su.tr v American Ked'ii of St.»l«\
County A Mui.kipa! Employers, Local 17JG. 2‘.»8
A.2d 362 (Del. th l'JTJh
And Koverno t nf il unit is bound to do thus*
things within II- Irgitimalr power. — AUl ou^lt
bargaining rvprosontative. (19 Del. C.
a fulhvtiv %* harpaiimu' ncrtvim-nt rumd hind
the Lb partim-nl <•( llc.thh nod Social SmhVt In
the evpeiuhturc of fro-l* fur tculih insur.'iwe
until iI.i»m* funds luii been • rojwr'.y a| propri*
ted, it can amt dues hunt the IVp.irtm.'i.t In .to
all of those tnin£* the a^rcumcnt .Miiicii-pl itea
which arc wul.ui llm Dt-p.irttm-iit s |. yri’.ininU*
|Hiwcrs Suite v. American Ked n of Mate.
Count v A Municipal Kmplow. s he d 17 ju. 4S8
A V I 362 (Del. Ch. U*72|
And niny be fompllrj to gi%e priority to
hui'.icil request for baigaiurihfor hrniTit. —
Ahh'uiph the Chancery Court without power
to order th. expenditure ««; fund* for heat'h in*
snrar.cn without a| j i- i-i
.
aliou, w|«.--i the IV-
purlmcnt of II ait!, ami Snc;.il t?r*' •> a^nct
ina c«ll> cti\e h.ir>;.iei.i ^ roiur.id to that the
iii'-uranee 1* provided. D< parlment iploiiv*
are entitled t<» .in order cump. lime t *• Di-p..rt*
menl to include the i./reod U}* n health in-»ur*
ance terms .»< a priority ilem in its budget State
i. American Ked'n of Slate, County Municipal
Employees, Local 1726. 2dS A.2u .102 llHrl. Ch.
1'JTJ).
§ 1310. Submission of dispute to Department of Laoor or arbi-
tration.
Upon the failure of the public employer and •’ ' : xclusive bar; raining rv;s
resentative to euneiu.le a colleelive bargaining a,: .1. any n.aUer in liispu:.',
exeepl ma’.Urs of wi.;. s and salaries, may Le s • e.l l>y either pnr’.y to the
19 5 1311 UlEOn 19 5 1312
D-parlment of Labor or, by agreement of the parties, to arbitration under
Chapter 1 of this title. (19 Del C. 1953, % I310. 55 Del. Daws, c. 120; 57 Del. laws,
c. C09, §5 2:’, MB.)
§ 1311. Payroll deduction for dues.
Upon the wril-en authorization nf a-v public employee within a bargaining
unit the public emplnver shall deduct from the payroll of the public
employee
the monthly .mount of dues as certified by the secretary of the
exclusive bar-
gaining representative and shall deliver the same to the trea urerof the
exclu-
sive bargaining representative. (19 Del. C. 1953, § 1311; 55 Del.
laws, c. 12b.)
§ 1312. Right to slr-Uc prohibited.
No public employee shall strike while in the performance of bis
official duties
(19 Del. C. 19-1, ^ Dili; f».’» lH-l l aws, c. 120;
Del. l^aws, c. 370, § 10.)
£tntu« of public rniploicM Ihun np.»rt.
|( , N || .1 i |,f ••il, I,! nil. * f I’M* w.uk • f * p' I* c
cmpluvc*-. I*i,t t|,c fat I li.al hi- lx OHi* J .'1 •• •'
lie • pi, I win )• •» 1*1. w *1*1 tin hl.dut' i'
« t ton-
lr.t.iu:il !-«• ti.cr.hi f...- i-f»« i. wl" 1 ' 1
Iiii.i »p.,rt fr.cn w.-rk-r m ll.«- p»r. I>
• r.% • -
ns l.tr wli.'M* rn.| r m.ib ' c "'" l ‘*
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APPENDIX E
ADMINISTRATORS AND DISTRICTS
PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY
Mr. Kenneth W. Caves
Supervisor of Personnel
Appoquinimink School District
Odessa, Delaware
Mr. Hugh A. Kelly
Superintendent
Delmar School District
Delmar, Delaware
Mr. Archie R. Jordan
Assistant Superintendent
for Personnel
Caesar Rodney School District
Camden-Wyoming, Delaware
Mr. Sidney B. Collison
Assistant Superintendent
Instructional Services
Alexis I. DuPont School
District
Greenville, Delaware
Mr. Robert V. Martin
Director of Personnel and
Secondary Education
Cape Henlopen School District
Nassau, Delaware
Mr. Phillip J. Dahlinger
Administrative Assistant
Alfred I. DuPont School
District
Wilmington, Delaware
Mr. James C. Hardcastle
Director of Personnel and
Special Projects
Capital School District
Dover, Delaware
Mr. William P. Bant
Personnel Director
Indian River School
District
Frankford, Delaware
Mr . Richard Rooney
Administrative Assistant
Claymont School District
Claymont, Delaware
Mr. Joseph M. Orlando
Administrative Assistant
Kent County Vocational
School District
Woodside, Delaware
Mr. Franklin A. Rishel
Special Personnel and
Federal Programs
Conrad Area School District
Wilmington, Delaware
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